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41 Introduction
While the costs of AIDS in terms of human suffering and lives lost are undeniably large, es-
timates of the associated macroeconomic costs have tended to be more modest. For example,
studies that focus on Africa – the continent where the epidemic has hit the hardest – calculate
the annual loss of GDP to be around one percent (see Table 1). These estimates all stem from
a particular view of how the economy functions, namely, where the AIDS-induced increase
in mortality reduces the pressure of population on existing land and capital, thereby raising
the productivity of labor. Even if there is a decline in savings and investment (from the real-
location of expenditures towards medical care), its impact on GDP growth is dampened by
the countervailing effect of increased labor productivity. Consequently, the net effect on the
growth rate of per-capita GDP is very modest.
Table 1: The Impact of AIDS on GDP Growth: Selected Studies




South Africa CGE simulations –0.8 to –1.0
Bonnel (2000) 47 Countries Cross-country regres-
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–0.7a
Kambou et al. (1992) Cameroon CGE simulations –0.5 to –1.2










a GDP per capita
In this paper, we argue that the long-run economic costs of AIDS are almost certain to be
much higher – and possibly devastating. We take a very different view of how the economy
functions over the long run, one which emphasizes the importance of human capital and
transmission mechanism across generations. The formation of human capital, which should
5be thought of as the entire stock of knowledge and abilities (general and speciﬁc) embodied
in the population, plays a leading role in promoting economic growth. The accumulation of
human capital is the force that generates economic growth over the very long run. If, as is
highly plausible, the mechanism that drives the process is the transmission of knowledge and
abilities from one generation to the next, then a widespread epidemic of AIDS will result in
a substantial slowing of economic growth, and may even result in an economic collapse. The
implications of this model are particularly relevant to Africa, as it is the continent with the
lowest level of human capital and the highest prevalence of the disease.
The argument establishing how AIDS can severely retard economic growth, even to the point
of leading to an economic collapse, is made in three steps. First, AIDS destroys existing
human capital in a selective way. It is primarily a disease of young adults. A few years after
they become infected, it reduces their productivity by making them sick and weak, and then
it kills them in their prime, thereby destroying the human capital progressively built up in
them through child-rearing, formal education, and learning on the job.
Second, AIDS weakens or even wrecks the mechanisms that generate human capital forma-
tion. In the household, the quality of child-rearing depends heavily on the parents’ human
capital, as broadly deﬁned above. If one or, worse, both parents die while their offspring
are still children, the transmission of knowledge and potential productive capacity across the
two generations will be weakened. At the same time, the loss of income due to disability
and early death reduces the lifetime resources available to the family, which may well result
in the children spending much less time (if any at all) at school. The outcome can be quite
pathological. Finally, the chance that the children themselves will contract the disease in
adulthood makes investment in their education less attractive, even when both parents them-
selves remain uninfected. The weakening of these transmission processes is insidious; for
its effects are felt only over the longer run, as the poor education of children today translates
into low productivity of adults a generation hence.
Third, asthechildrenofAIDSvictimsbecomeadultswithlittleeducationandlimitedknowl-
6edge received from their parents, they are in turn less able to raise their own children and
to invest in their education. A vicious cycle ensues. If nothing is done, the outbreak of the
disease will eventually precipitate a collapse of economic productivity. In the early phases
of the epidemic, the damage may appear to be slight. But as the transmission of capacities
and potential from one generation to the next is progressively weakened and the failure to
accumulate human capital becomes more pronounced, the economy will begin to slow down,
with the growing threat of a collapse to follow.
This is the essence of the argument. It has two particularly important implications for eco-
nomic policy. The ﬁrst is ﬁscal in nature. By killing off mainly young adults, AIDS also
seriously weakens the tax base, and so reduces the resources available to meet the demands
for public expenditures, including those aimed at accumulating human capital, such as ed-
ucation and health services not related to AIDS. Thus, for any given level of ﬁscal effort,
the deleterious effects of the disease on economic growth over the longer run are intensiﬁed
through this channel. As a result, the state’s ﬁnances will come under increasing pressure.
Slower growth of the economy means slower growth of the tax base, an effect that will be
reinforced if there are growing expenditures on treating the sick and caring for orphans.
The other effect is to exacerbate inequality. If the children left orphaned are not given the
care and education enjoyed by those whose parents remain uninfected, the weakening of the
inter-generational transmission mechanism will express itself in increasing inequality among
the next generation of adults and the families they form. Social customs of adoption and fos-
tering, however well-established, may not be able to cope with the scale of the problem
generated by a sharp increase in adult mortality, thereby shifting the onus onto the govern-
ment. As just argued, however, the government itself is likely to experience increasing ﬁscal
difﬁculties, and so lack the resources to assume this additional burden in full.
In addition to the contributions on the macroeconomic effects of AIDS discussed above,
the present paper is related to other strands of the literature. It is motivated, in part, by
the empirical observation that good health has a positive and statistically signiﬁcant effect
7on aggregate output (Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 1995; Bloom and Canning, 2000; Bloom,
Canning and Sevilla, 2001). The recent report by the Commission on Macroeconomics and
Health (WHO, 2001) has also stressed that widespread diseases are a formidable barrier to
economic growth.
In order to analyze the long-term effects of AIDS, however, some of the speciﬁc features of
the relationship between health and economic growth must be treated in detail. In particular,
there must be a link between the course of the epidemic and economic growth, in the form
of feedbacks from premature mortality to education, the formation of human capital and
output. For this purpose, we extend the overlapping generations (OLG) model of Bell and
Gersbach (2002), which analyzes the nexus of child labor, education and growth, in order
to deal with disease-ridden environments, in which some existing level of premature adult
mortality is increased by the outbreak of an epidemic and can be mitigated by spending on
measures designed to combat it. Parents have preferences over current consumption and the
level of human capital attained by their children, making due allowances for early mortality
in adulthood. The decision about how much to invest in education is inﬂuenced by premature
adult mortality in two ways: ﬁrst, the family’s lifetime income depends on the adults’ health
status, and second, the expected pay-off depends on the level of premature mortality among
children themselves when they attain adulthood. The outbreak of AIDS leads to an increase
in such mortality, and if the prevalence of the disease becomes sufﬁciently high, there may
be progressive collapse of human capital and productivity.
The policy problem, therefore, is to avoid such a collapse. The instruments available for
this purpose are (i) spending on measures to contain the disease and treat the infected, (ii)
aiding orphans, in the form of income-support or subsidies contingent on school attendance,
and (iii) taxes to ﬁnance the expenditure program. The central policy problem is to ﬁnd the
right balance among these interventions in order to ensure economic growth over the long
run without excessive inequality.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the ﬁrst two parts of the paper, we approach con-
8ceptually the questions of how AIDS impinges on the economy and how its effects can be
combatted by suitable policies. The basic model is set out in section 2.1, with special at-
tention paid to the effects of premature adult mortality on (nuclear) family structure and the
schoolingofchildren. Thedynamicsofthesystemunderanexogenousmortalityproﬁle, cor-
responding to some given disease environment, are analyzed in section 2.2. Pooling, where
members of the extended family take in orphans, as an alternative form of organization that
has both advantages and drawbacks in such a setting, is analyzed in section 2.3.
This sets the stage for the analysis of the policy problem in section 3, where the outbreak of
the AIDS epidemic is modeled as an adverse shock to an existing proﬁle of premature adult
mortality. Interventions in the spheres of health and education are examined separately in
section 3.2, and jointly in section 3.3. Finding the right balance between these two sets of
measures is the central policy problem, and the results in these sections attempt to illuminate
how the balance should be struck. The possibilities of multiple equilibria and self-fulﬁlling
prophecies, together with the associated credibility of public policy, are pursued in section
3.4. An extensive treatment of what can be called ‘fairly good’ policy programs is the subject
of section 4, in which the aim is to develop simpler alternatives than those requiring the
computation of a full optimum.
In the third part of the paper we apply the model to South Africa. The choice of South Africa
as a test-bed is a natural one on several grounds. First, the very nature of the model demands
that the available economic and demographic series be long and fairly reliable if there is to
be a solid base for calibration. Second, South Africa is a middle-income country that has
experienced substantial growth over much of the past half century. A collapse of the kind
analyzed in the theoretical sections of this paper, were it to occur, would therefore mean that
there is a long way to fall. Third, the epidemic has progressed rapidly in South Africa, from
a prevalence rate among the population aged 15 to 49 of about one per cent in 1990 to just
over 20 per cent a decade later (UNAIDS, 2002). The demographic writing is already on the
wall (see especially Dorrington et al., 2001).
9The calibration of the model is described in section 5.1. On this basis, the model is used,
in section 5.2, to generate the trajectories of the main variables in a variety of settings. The
government’s task is to choose, within certain restrictions, a sequence of tax schedules, in
order to yield the resources to ﬁnance a sequence of expenditures on, respectively, measures
to combat the epidemic and the support of needy children so as to induce their education.
There are two reference cases, one of which is a counterfactual without the epidemic, and
several policy variations, depending on the instruments actually available to the government.
A whole array of sensitivity tests is employed in section 5.3 to assess the robustness of the
ﬁndings in section 5.2.
The last section is devoted to an assessment of the overall results and the most fruitful direc-
tions of future research.
2 Positive Theory
2.1 The Model
We extend the OLG-model of Bell and Gersbach (2002) by introducing premature mortality
among adults. There are two periods of life, childhood and adulthood, whereby the course
of adulthood runs as follows. On becoming adults, individuals immediately form families
and have their children. When the children are very young, they can neither work nor attend
school. Since the only form of investment is education, the family’s full income is wholly
consumed in this phase. Only after this phase is over do the adults learn whether they will
die prematurely, and so leave their children as half- or full orphans. Early in each generation
of adults, therefore, all nuclear families are sorted into one of the following four categories:
1. both parents survive into old age,
2. the father dies prematurely,
103. the mother dies prematurely,
4. both parents die prematurely.
These states are denoted by st 2 St := f1;2;3;4g. The probability that a family formed at
the start of period t lands in category st is denoted by pt(st). The population is assumed to
be large enough that this is also the fraction of all families in that state after all premature
adult deaths have occurred. An important consequence of such mortality is that it results in
heterogeneity among each cohort of families. Once their states have been revealed, families
make their decisions accordingly, as will be described below.




t denote, respectively, the father’s and mother’s endowments of human capital, and let




t ; Lt(2) = lm
t ; Lt(3) = l
f
t ; Lt(4) = 0: (1)
An additional source of heterogeneity is ruled out in advance:




Hence, (1) specializes to
Lt(1) = 2lt;Lt(2) = Lt(3) = lt;Lt(4) = 0; (2)
where the superscripts f and m may be dropped without introducing ambiguity.
Human capital is assumed to be formed by a process of child-rearing combined with formal
education in the following way. In the course of rearing their children, parents give them
1This assumption is solely made for simplicity of the exposition of our main arguments.
11a certain capacity to build human capital for adulthood, a capacity which is itself increas-
ing in the parents’ own human capital. This gift will be of little use, however, unless it is
complemented by at least some formal education, in the course of which the basic skills of
reading, writing and calculating can be learned. Let the proportion of childhood devoted to
education be denoted by et 2 [0;1], the residual being allocated to work, and for simplicity,
let all the children in a family be treated in the same way. Expressed formally, the human





z(st)f(et)Lt(st)+1; st = 1;2;3
x st = 4
(3)
Beginning with the upper branch of (3), the term zt(st) represents the strength with which
capacity is transmitted across generations. It is plausible that the father’s and mother’s con-
tributions to this process are not perfect substitutes, in which case, 2z(1) > max[z(2);z(3)]
and z(2) may not be equal to z(3). For simplicity, however, we introduce
Assumption 2. z(2) = z(3) ¸ z(1) ¸ z(2)=2 = z(3)=2:
z(1) = z(2) = z(3) holds when the parents are perfect complements and 2z(1) = z(2) = z(3)
when they are perfect substitutes. Assumptions 1 and 2 allow the upper branch of (3) to be
rewritten as
lt+1 = (3¡st)z(st)f(et)lt +1; st = 1;2 (4)
both types of single-parent families being identical in this respect. The function f(¢) may be
thought of as representing the educational technology – translating time spent on education
into learning.
Assumption 3. f(¢) is a continuous, strictly increasing and differentiable function on [0, 1],
with f(0) = 0:
12Observe that assumption 3 implies that children who do not attend school at all attain, as
adults, only some basic level of human capital, which has been normalized to unity. A whole
society of such adults will be said to be in a state of backwardness.
According to the lower branch of (3), there is a miserable outcome for full orphans who do
not enjoy the good fortune to be adopted or placed in (good) institutional care. Deprived of
love and care, and being left to their own devices, they go through childhood uneducated, to
attain human capital x (· 1) in adulthood.
The next step is to relate human capital to current output, which takes the form of an aggre-
gate consumption good. The following assumption implies that current output will accrue to
families as income in proportion to the amounts of labor, measured in efﬁciency units, that
they supply.
Assumption 4. Output is proportional to inputs of labor measured in efﬁciency units.
A natural normalization is that an adult who possesses human capital in the amount lt is
endowed with lt efﬁciency units of labor, which he or she supplies completely inelastically.
A child’s contribution to the household’s income is given as follows: In view of the com-
plementarity between the potential capacity received during rearing and formal education, a
child will supply at most one efﬁciency unit of labor during childhood. Indeed, it is plausible
that a child’s efﬁciency will be somewhat lower than the parents’, ceteris paribus, on grounds
ofagealone. Toreﬂecttheseconsiderations, letachildsupply g(1¡et(st))efﬁciencyunitsof
labor when the child works 1¡et(st) units of time. It is plausible to assume that g 2 (0;x);
i.e. a full-time working child is at most as productive as an adult who happened to be an






where the scalar a(> 0) denotes the productivity of human capital, measured in units of
output per efﬁciency unit of labor input.
132.1.1 The Household’s Behavior
It is assumed that all allocative decisions lie in the parents’ hands, as long as they are alive.
We rule out any bequests at death, so that the whole of current income, as given by (5), is
consumed. Concerning the allocation of consumption within the family, let the husband and
wife enjoy equality as partners, and let each child obtain a fraction b 2 (0;1) of an adult’s
consumption if at least one adult survives. Full orphans (st = 4) do not attend school, and
consume what they produce as child laborers.
From (2), the budget sets of single-mother and single-father households with the same en-
dowments of human capital and the same number of children are identical. In the absence of
any taxes or subsidies, the household’s budget line may therefore be written as
[(3¡st)+ntb]ct(st)+antget(st) = a[(3¡st)lt +ntg]; st = 1;2 (6)
where ct(st) is the level of each adult’s consumption. The expression on the LHS repre-
sents the costs of consumption and the opportunity costs of the children’s schooling. The
expression on the RHS is the family’s so-called full income2 in state st = 1;2;3; whereby
assumption 1 ensures that states 2 and 3 are identical where the budget set is concerned.
Observe that single-parent households not only have lower levels of full income than their
otherwise identical two-parent counterparts, but that they also face a higher relative price of
education, deﬁned as antg=[(3¡st)+ntb].
In keeping with the rather imperfect state of knowledge about the relationship between AIDS
and fertility, we make no attempt to model fertility in a sophisticated way. Let all mortality
among children occur in infancy, and suppose that so-called ‘replacement fertility’ behavior
is unhindered by premature adult mortality. Then:
2A household’s full income is the scalar product of its endowment vector and the vector of market prices.
Here, output is taken as the num´ eraire.
14Assumption 5. Couples have children while they are young until some exogenously ﬁxed
number have survived infancy, a target that may vary from period to period.
With nt thus ﬁxed, the adults wait until the state of the family becomes known, and the
survivor(s) then choose some feasible pair (ct(st);et(st)) ¸ 0 subject to (6).
Parents are assumed to have preferences over their own current consumption and the human
capital attained by their children in adulthood, taking into account the fact that an investment
in a child’s education will be wholly wasted if that child dies prematurely in adulthood. Let
mothers and fathers have identical preferences, and for two-parent households, let there be
no ‘joint’ aspect to the consumption of the pair (ct(1);et(1)): each surviving adult derives
(expected) utility from the pair so chosen, and these utilities are then added up within the
family. In effect, whereas ct(1) is a private good, the human capital of the children in adult-
hood is a public good within the marriage. Since all the children attain lt+1, the only form
of uncertainty is that surrounding the number who will not die prematurely as adults, which
is denoted by at+1. Let preferences be separable, with representation
EUt(st) = (3¡st)[u(ct(st))+Etat+1n(lt+1)]; st = 1;2 (7)
where the contribution n(lt+1) counts only when death does not come early, Et is the expec-
tation operator and Etat+1 is the expected number of children surviving into old age. The
sub-utility functions u(¢) and v(¢) are assumed to be increasing, continuous, concave and
twice-differentiable. Denoting by pt+1(st+1) the parents’ subjective probability that a child
will ﬁnd itself in state st+1 in period t +1, so that
P4
st+1=1pt+1(st+1) = 1, and recalling
assumption 1 and that all children are treated identically, we obtain
Etat+1n(lt+1) = ntkt+1v(lt+1);
where
kt+1 ´ [1+pt+1(1)¡pt+1(4)]=2 (8)
15and lt+1 is given by the upper branch of (3). Observe that kt+1 = 1 if and only if there is no
premature adult mortality (pt+1(1) = 1), and that kt+1 < 1 otherwise. A reduction in kt+1,
therefore, effectively entails a weaker taste for the children’s education. By way of illustra-
tion, let premature mortality among adults be independently and identically distributed, and
denote the probability that an adult will survive to old age by pt. Then,
pt(1) = p2
t ; pt(2) = pt(3) = pt(1¡ pt); pt(4) = (1¡ pt)2; kt = pt
It will be convenient in what follows to rewrite (7) as
EUt(st) = (3¡st)[u(ct(st))+ntkt+1v(z(st)f(et)Lt(st)+1)]; st = 1;2 (9)
A family in state st(= 1;2;3) in period t solves the following problem:
max
[ct(st);et(st)]
EUt(st) s.t.(6); ct(st) ¸ 0; et(st) 2 [0;1]: (10)
Let [c0
t (st); e0
t (st)] solve problem (10), whose parameters are (kt+1; lt; nt; st; a; b; g). By







Since current consumption is maximized by choosing et = 0, it follows that the parents’
altruism towards their children must be sufﬁciently strong if they are to chose et > 0:
Assumption 6. Both goods are non-inferior.3









Inspection of EUt(st) reveals that an increase in kt+1 induces an increase in e0
t (st) if
0 < e0
t (st) < 1 and preserves e0
t (st) = 1; for it increases the weight on n(lt+1) relative to
3Note that Lt enters both the budget constraint and the utility that adults derive from lt+1. Therefore, the
deﬁnition of inferior goods is not the same as the textbook description in this particular set-up.
16that on u(ct(st)). An increase in kt+1 therefore has the opposite effect on c0
t (st).
The remaining comparative static results concern the effect of family status in the present on
investment in, and the accumulation of, human capital. Note that the upper boundaries of the
budget sets in the cases st = 2 and st = 3 lie strictly inside that associated with st = 1 and
that the price of ct relative to et is lower for st = 2;3 than for st = 1. We then obtain:
Lemma 1
Suppose lt is given. Then, under assumptions 1, 2 and 6,
(i) e0
t (1) ¸ e0
t (2) = e0
t (3)
(ii) lt+1(1) ¸ lt+1(2) = lt+1(3)
(iii) ¶e0
t (st)=¶kt+1 > 0 if 0 < e0
t (st) < 1:
We now introduce the assumption that altruism is not operative when the adults are unedu-
cated:
Assumption 7. For Lt(1) · 2; e0
t (1) = 0:
Part (i) of Lemma 1 then yields e0
t (2) = e0
t (3) = 0 as a trivial corollary.
2.1.2 Dynamics
Recalling that e0












Lt(st)+1; st = 1;2;3
x; st = 4
(11)
Equation (11) describes a random dynamical system, in the sense that although each child
attains lt+1 in adulthood with certainty, he or she can wind up in any of the states st+1 2
f1;2;3;4g after reaching adulthood and forming a family. In the absence of premature mor-
17tality(pt+1(1)=1), =0..inﬁnitytheabovesystemhasatleasttwosteadystatesifz(1)f(1)2la+
1¸la; where la is the lowest level of an adult’s human capital such that a two-parent house-
hold chooses full education for the children in such an environment (Bell and Gersbach,
2002).
The typical dynamics in the absence of premature mortality are illustrated in ﬁgure 1, where
Ld (> 2) denotes the smallest endowment of the adults’ human capital such that they just
begin to send their children to school. La(= 2la) denotes the corresponding endowment
at which children ﬁnally enjoy full-time schooling. As depicted, the system has two steady
states. First, there is the state of backwardness (L = 2). This stable steady state is a poverty
trap, wherein all generations are at the lowest level of human capital. Second, there is an
unstable steady state (Lt = L¤ 8 t), in which the parents’ human capital is such that they
choose a positive level of education for their children that also yields each of the latter L¤=2











where pt(1) = 1 for all t. Observe that starting from any L > L¤; unbounded growth is
possible if and only if 2z(1)f(1) ¸ 1; and that the growth rate approaches 2z(1)f(1)¡1
asymptotically.
Matters become more complicated when there is premature adult mortality. First, the values
of Ld;L¤ and La depend both on st 2f1;2;3g and on kt+1. Second, a separate phase diagram
is needed for each pair of states in periods t and t +1. For example, the offspring of a two-
parent family in period t all attain the lt+1 corresponding to Lt(1), but not all their offspring
are raised in two-parent families. In principle, therefore, a phase diagram is required for
each of the cases in the set St £St+1. The ensuing heterogeneity and its consequences for the











Figure 1: The phase diagram in the absence of premature adult mortality.
2.2 Disease, Increasing Inequality and Economic Collapse
The process by which the onset of a disease like AIDS leads to economic collapse can be de-
scribedasfollows: Atthestartofperiodt =0, asocietyofhomogeneoustwo-parentfamilies,
each with adult human capital endowment 2l0, is suddenly assailed by some fatal disease.
Immediately after their children are born, all adults learn whether they are infected with the






for s0 = 1;2;3. We are interested in
the question: how does the outbreak of the disease affect the subsequent development of the
society? Children who are left as unsupported orphans (s0 = 4) fall at once into the poverty





= 0 8t: even if both parents survive but have
19been orphans in childhood, they cannot afford to send their children to school. In the absence
of support, therefore, all orphans fall into the poverty trap, and their succeeding lineage re-
mains there. In order to discover what happens to the rest, we introduce the critical value
function l¤(s;kt) for s 2 f1;2;3g; nt+1 = nt; 8t and kt = k; 8t deﬁned by:





where L¤(1) = 2l¤(1), L¤(2) = L¤(3) = l¤(2) = l¤(3), and k is a sufﬁcient statistic of
premature adult mortality in the steady state. l¤(s;k) is the steady-state human capital as-
sociated with a particular state s, that is, in any pair of generations, parent(s) and offspring
share the same state.
In order to establish the relationship between l¤(s;k) and e0(L¤(s);s;k), we differentiate










An increase in premature adult mortality increases l¤(s;k); s = 1;2;3: To be precise, we
have
Lemma 2
(i) ¶l¤(s;k)=¶k < 0; s = 1;2;3
(ii) l¤(1;k) · l¤(2;k) = l¤(3;k)
Proof :









By virtue of (12), the right hand side is equal to 1
l¤ and hence the denominator in (13) is
negative. According to the third part of Lemma 1, the numerator in (13) is positive, which
20proves the ﬁrst clain. To establish the second claim, observe that, starting in any period t,
l¤(1;k)=z(1)f(e0(L¤;1;k)¢L¤(1;k)+1¸lt+1(2;k)=z(2)f(e0(L¤(2);2;k)¢L¤(1;k)=2+1
by virtue of assumption 2 and the ﬁrst part of lemma 1. The second claim then follows at
once.
The ﬁrst part of lemma 2 implies that an increase in premature adult mortality may cause
a group that was earlier enjoying self-sustaining growth to fall into the poverty trap. The
second part implies that single-parent families need higher individual levels of human capital
than two-parent ones to escape the trap, so that an increase in premature adult mortality also
increases the share falling into the poverty trap by increasing the proportion of one-parent
families4.
2.2.1 Short-Run Dynamics
We now turn to the short-run dynamics following a shock represented by kt = k < 1 for all
t ¸ 0. We denote by Pt the fraction of the population of adults whose human capital is at
most unity in period t. Similarly, Rt denotes the fraction of individuals that possess at least
l¤(2;k). Note that Pt +Rt · 1. We obtain the following results:
Lemma 3
Suppose that l0 > l¤(1;1).
(i) If l0 ¸ l¤(2;k), then
P1 = p(4); R1 = 1¡p(4)
4In appendix 7.1, we provide a detailed analysis of an example, in order to illustrate the most important
results from our household model and how the steady state associated with a particular household state st =
(1;2;3) depends on preferences, premature mortality, discounting, the characteristics of child labor and child
consumption, and the productivity of human capital. The example also reveals that the existence of a unique,
unstable steady state cannot be taken for granted, even when the model does not take its most general form.
21(ii) If l¤(2;k) > l0 ¸ l¤(1;k) , then
P1 ¸ p(4); R1 · p(1)
(iii) If l¤(1;k) > l0 , then
P1 ¸ p(4); R1 = 0
The three claims immediately follow from our preceding discussion. In case (i), families
with at least one surviving adult will continue to enjoy self-sustaining growth, although one-
parent households will henceforth experience growth at a lower rate if z(1) > z(2)=2, even
if e0
0(2) = 1. This adverse effect will be reinforced if e0 falls following the shock. The re-
sulting inequality among families with adults will be propagated into the future, with further
differentiation arising both from the transmission factor z(s), and from future differences in
e0
t (¢) among them. In case (ii), only families with two adults will continue to experience
self-sustaining growth, whereas all the others will descend into the poverty trap. Thereafter,
the pattern of progressive differentiation described in case (i) will also take hold here. In
case (iii), all families begin to descend into poverty immediately.
2.2.2 Long-Run Dynamics
The preceding discussion yields straightforward implications for long-run dynamics, which
are summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 1
If kt < 1 for all t ¸ 0, then:
(i) Pt ¸ Pt¡1+pt¡1(4)(1¡Pt¡1); t ¸ 1
(ii) limt!¥ Pt = 1
Notethatpart(i)ofproposition1holdsasanequalityifl0 ¸l¤(2;1). Proposition1indicates
that the share of uneducated families grows over time until, in the limit, the whole population
22is in backwardness. Not only do some adults suffer sickness and early death, but the whole
society descends progressively into the poverty trap. This dramatic implication leads one to
ask what social arrangements can be made to deal with this danger. One answer is to pool
the risks.
2.3 Pooling as a Social Response
The prevailing form of social organization has a potentially important inﬂuence on how the
economic system copes with premature adult mortality. We can distinguish among three
types.
First, there is the family as the nucleus of society (the nuclear family), which is essentially
the preceding set-up of our model. Parents are solely responsible for their own children, so
that the fortunes of children depend entirely on their natural parents’ health status and human
capital (or income).
The second involves collective (or pooling) arrangements to some degree. We shall say that
partial pooling occurs when a subset of society, be it a region, a city, a tribe, even a very
large extended family, pools its resources. It is widely observed that in Africa, for example,
orphans are often taken in by, and rotated among, relatives. It is sometimes claimed that the
relatives also treat such children as if they were their own; but this goes too far – for instance,
Case, Paxson and Abledidinger (2002) show that the schooling of orphans depends heavily
on how closely they are related to the adoptive household head. To cover this arrangement,
we allow sufﬁciently large subsets of the society – subintervals in our model – to be pooled,
that is to say, all surviving adults in the subset take on joint responsibility for all children in
their group. For simplicity, we assume that within each generation, all adults and children in
the subset are treated identically. Partial pooling of the society in subintervals is assumed to
be on such a scale that aggregate uncertainty outvanishes5. Note that partial pooling sufﬁces
5It can be shown that, by the same construction as in the general model, aggregate uncertainty cancels out
23to diversify completely the idiosyncratic mortality risk, and pooled groups face only the
aggregate risk, as summarized by k. Note also that under partial pooling, children and adults
may fare very differently across pooled subsocieties, either because of differences in initial
conditions or because public policy favors one subsociety over another.
Thirdly, there is the extreme case of complete pooling, in which all surviving adults in the
society take on joint responsibility for all children. It should be remarked that complete
pooling does not increase the scope for providing insurance; for, by assumption, partial
pooling already sufﬁces to achieve complete insurance against idiosyncratic risks. Complete
pooling does impose an equal-treatment constraint on the policies we discuss in the sections
that follow. Pooling also introduces the need for a little additional notation: it will be denoted
by the family state st = 0:
2.3.1 The household’s behavior under complete pooling
By assumption 5, each couple produces nt surviving children in period t; but not all of the
adults themselves survive to rear their offspring. Under complete pooling, the children are









children. In effect, the burden of premature adult mortality is borne equally by all surviving
members of a generation. The budget line of a representative ‘pair’ is
[2+(nt=kt)b]ct(0)+a(nt=kt)get(0) = a[2lt +(nt=kt)g]; (15)
in subintervals that have positive measure.
24a comparison of which with (6) reveals that, relative to an otherwise identical two-parent
nuclear family, the presence of premature adult mortality implies, ﬁrst, a lower relative price
of current consumption, and second, a lower level of full income, measured in units of an
adult’s consumption, so long as b>g. On this score, therefore, a rise in such mortality works
to reduce education, relative to the two-parent, nuclear family. Pursuing this point further, it
is also seen that by setting kt equal to 1 and 1/2, (15) specializes to the cases st =1 and st =2,
respectively, in (6). As we will now see, however, pooling is not necessarily an intermediate
case between one- and two-parent nuclear families whenever kt 2 [1=2;1]:
One can think of the pooling arrangement as a representative two-parent family looking
after nt=kt children, as opposed to either one or two parents looking after nt, as analyzed in
sections 2.1 and 2.2. In order to bring out this point, the transmission factor under pooling
is written as z(0;kt); where we use the state 0 to denote pooling. If there is no premature
adult mortality, pooling is never called into operation, so that z(0;1) = z(1). If kt = 1=2, the
question arises whether two parents can impart a higher potential to each of 2nt children than
one parent (of either sex) to nt; in keeping with assumption 2, they could hardly do worse.
We therefore introduce:
Assumption 8. For any given nt, z(0;kt) is a non-decreasing, continuous and differentiable
function of kt; it also satisﬁes z(0;1=2) ¸ z(2)=2 and z(0;1) = z(1).
Hence, the formation of human capital under pooling is given by:
lt+1 = 2z(0;kt)f(et)lt +1 (16)
Turning to preferences, let the ‘couple’ display the same degree of altruism towards natural
and adopted children alike, which implies that all children will be treated in the same way.
We have
EUt(0) = 2[u(ct(0))+nt(kt+1=kt)v(2z(0;kt)f(et)lt +1)]: (17)
Since kt < 1, a comparison of (17) with (9) reveals that there is a greater weight on the
childrens’futurehumancapitalintheformer(pooling)thaninthelatter(inwhichtheweights
25are identical for one- and two-parent families). The assumption that the adults view all
children in their care with equal altruism therefore tugs in the opposite direction to that of
the price and income effects where investment in education is concerned.
The steady-state value of human capital in the pooling case satisﬁes
l¤(0;k) = 2z(0;k)f(e0(2l¤(0;k);0;k))¢l¤(0;k))+1: (18)
Were it not for the force of equal altruism towards all children under pooling, the argument in
part (ii) of lemma 2 and assumption 8 would yield the following result: l¤(1;k)·l¤(0;k)·
l¤(2;k) for all k 2 [1=2;1]. As it is, an alternative assumption will sufﬁce to ensure that it
indeed holds.
Lemma 4
Suppose, by social convention, that all children must be treated identically, but surviving
adults value only the future human capital attained by their natural children. Then
l¤(1;k) · l¤(0;k) · l¤(2;k) for all k 2 [1=2;1]:
2.3.2 The virtues and drawbacks of pooling
Since pooling is a form of social insurance against premature mortality, it is interesting to
ask whether this form of organization is better able to withstand a shock than one based on
the nuclear family. The answer turns out to depend on the initial level of human capital.
Proposition 2
Suppose the disease breaks out in period 0, with resulting mortality represented by k (< 1).
(i) If l¤(0;k) < l0, no collapse will occur.
(ii) If l¤(0;k) > l0, the entire group begins an immediate descent into the poverty trap.
26The proof of proposition 2 is straightforward. The outcome in part (i) is in contrast to that
in part (ii) of proposition 1. Under pooling, moreover, perfect equality is maintained within
each generation. The drawback arises when the change in mortality is so large that the
initial level of human capital no longer lies above the critical level in the newly prevailing
disease environment. Equality of treatment then pulls everyone down together, whereas in a
nuclear family structure with l¤(1;k) < l0 < l¤(0;k), two-parent families will continue to
experience growth. This latter fact plays a very important role when policy interventions are
possible, for two-parent families comprise the main tax base in a nuclear family setting.
3 The Policy Problem
3.1 Rationale and Instruments
In the light of section 2, there is a clear and compelling rationale for public intervention,
namely, to stave off the economic collapse, with all of its baneful social and human conse-
quences, which an epidemic like AIDS threatens to set in train. In order to draw up a plan of
action, it is important to identify the four main reasons why policy intervention is desirable
in settings of the present kind. The ﬁrst and main case for intervention rests on the exter-
nalities that arise when the improvements in all future generations’ welfare that would stem
from a better education of today’s children and from their good health in adulthood are not
fully reﬂected in the preferences of today’s parents, who are assumed to make the relevant
decisions in the present. If, as is arguable, the government has – or should have – a longer
horizon than individual households, then the case for intervention to promote schooling at
the expense of child labor and to lower premature adult mortality by combating the disease
is, in principle, established.
Second, communicable diseases have a strong public good aspect, which calls for public
intervention on standard grounds. This argument is reinforced when the disease reduces
27the returns to investment in human capital. Third, when there is asymmetric information
regarding the consequences of a disease and how to prevent it, a case can be established for
public campaigns that provide information on how to protect against, and to deal with, the
disease – and for the provision of the right incentives to undertake such measures. Fourth, as
discussed from section 3.4 of the paper onwards, more than one time path – self-sustaining
growth and enduring poverty are two possibilities – can exist under the same set of policies.
These arguments provide strong justiﬁcations for governments to promote education and to
combat diseases, especially the communicable kind like AIDS, and to do so in a way that
makes future policy credible.
The instruments available to the government to attain the broad objectives of averting a col-
lapse and ensuring the conditions for self-sustaining growth in a disease-ridden environment
are of three kinds:
(i) subsidies designed to encourage education;
(ii) spending on measures to combat the spread of the disease and to treat those infected
by it; and
(iii) raising the taxes needed to ﬁnance these expenditures.
The associated policies are now discussed in greater detail, whereby we concentrate on the
case of nuclear families.
3.1.1 Education Policy
The direct promotion of education takes the form of subsidies to households. These are paid
either as general transfers or, more efﬁciently, conditional on the children attending school.
They are ﬁnanced by taxes on income, where it should be noted that a household’s ability to
28pay depends on its state. For simplicity, therefore, we introduce
Assumption 9. The government can identify both a household and its state. Only the income
of (healthy) adults is taxable.6
Let tt(Li
t(st)) denote the tax levied in period t on household i if it is in state st. Some
fraction of the population will be subsidized out of the ensuing revenues. Starting with
general transfers, we denote by gi
t(Li
t(st)) the subsidy household i will receive in period t in
state st, where subsidies should be interpreted in a broad sense; for instance, they may take
the form of supporting local infrastructure. We denote by wi
t(st) the net income of household











t denotes the adults’ total net disposable income. The household’s net tax burden in







Although the family chooses ei
t on the basis of its potential full income after tax (equiva-
lently, on wia
t ), it is important to note that an increase in lt not only enlarges the feasible set
in the space of (ct;lt+1), but also make its upper boundary steeper. A decrease in the net tax
burden, however, will simply shift the said boundary to the right. Notice also that subsidiza-
tion can be made dependent on income and the household’s identity, i.e. on the index i. The
















t +ntg]; st = 1;2 (21)
6Taxing only adults may be justiﬁed by the easiness of tax evasion for child income. It is unlikely that
allowing household income to be taxable would change the main results of the paper.
29where si
t(Li
t(st)) is the subsidy payable to the family for each unit of time each child spends
at school, and it will be recalled from (2) that the states st = 2 and st = 3 are identical in this
respect.
Where ability to pay is concerned, we assume that there is a subsistence level csub for each
adult and bcsub for each child which must be ensured under all circumstances. Allowing for
the possibility that not all households with the same characteristics will receive subsidies,
household i’s tax burden is therefore constrained by:
a[(3¡st)li
t +ntg]¡tt(Li
t(st)) ¸ [(3¡st)+ntb]csub st = 1;2 (22)
where it is assumed that when li
t = 1 and the household receives no subsidies, all children
work full-time.
In order to make possible an escape from what we have termed a general state of backward-
ness without outside help, we allow for some limited ability to pay whenever li
t = 1. In
particular, the tax schedule for single-parent households must fulﬁll the condition
0 · tt(1(st)) · a(1+ntg)¡(1+ntb)csub ´ tba; (23)
whereitisplausiblethattba issmall. Notethatundertheinnocuousassumptionthata>csub,
a two parent-family is also able to pay at least tba.
3.1.2 Health Policy
Health policy takes the form of spending on measures to combat the disease. Here, we
distinguish not only between prevention and treatment, but also between expenditures that
produce private and public goods. For some diseases, treatment may result in a complete
cure. There is no such prospect for the victims of AIDS; but the treatment of opportunistic
infections in the later stages and the use of anti-retroviral therapies (ART) can prolong life
and maintain productivity. In the present OLG setting, therefore, treatment may be thought
30of as reducing premature adult mortality in the probabilistic sense. The distinction between
private and public goods is also an idealization, and a hard one to draw where communicable
diseases are concerned. Regular exercise and good diet, for example, will lower the chances
of heart disease only among those individuals who take this prescription seriously. Washing
one’s hands often, or staying at home when suffering from inﬂuenza, however, reduces the
chances of passing on infection to others. Large-scale public programs aimed at combat-
ing the spread of communicable diseases are therefore society-wide programs from which
everybody can beneﬁt and large externalities are present. Examples are public awareness
campaigns and, in the case of AIDS, the provision of condoms at no charge. The public
good nature of such health policies stems from the positive externalities that arise when
other individuals beneﬁt from the efforts of an individual to lower his or her risk of getting
infected, or, if already infected, the risk of also infecting others.
Formulating the effects of health policy is fairly straightforward in the ‘pure’ cases. Let the
probabilities that the adults (father and mother) in family i die prematurely be denoted by qfi
and qmi, respectively: the nature of AIDS being what it is, these are not independent events,
and we treat them as such only in section 5. If spending on prevention, broadly construed,
produces a purely private good for the individual in question, then
qli = ql(hli
t ;Li
t); l = f;m (24)
where hli
t is the amount spent on the individual in question and the possibility that the cou-
ple’s combined human capital upon forming the family may inﬂuence such mortality is al-
lowed.
At the other extreme, let spending on prevention produce a pure public good, where it is
possible that the size of the population may affect the efﬁcacy of spending. For simplicity,
we assume that the causes of premature adult mortality are no respecters of human capital,
so that we may write
ql = ql(ht;Nt); l = f;m (25)
where the number of families in period t is denoted by Nt and ht denotes the level of spend-
31ing per family. The measure of all families at the start of period 0 will be normalized to unity.
The function ql(¢) is assumed to have the following properties:
Assumption 10 ql(0;¢) = ¯ q(< 1); limht!¥ql(ht;Nt) = q; ¶ql=¶ht < 0; ¶2ql=¶(ht)2 > 0:
The same assumptions hold for qli = ql(hli
t ;Li
t): As indicated above, the treatment of dis-
eases prolongs productive life, even if no cure is available. When the disease is also com-
municable, substantial external beneﬁts will often result. In the framework adopted here, the
ensuing private and external beneﬁts will be represented as a reduction in premature adult
mortality.
3.1.3 The Government’s Budget Constraint
In formulating the budget constraint, some care is needed in distinguishing between the
level of an adult’s human capital and the state of the family to which he or she belongs. For
simplicity – and this will indeed hold in all the settings analyzed in the remainder of the paper
–, let there be a discrete distribution of the levels of individual adults’ human capital in any
period t, the vector of which is denoted by [l1
t ;:::;l
m(t)
t ], where the elements are arranged in
ascending order and the number of such classes in period t is denoted by m(t). The vector of
corresponding measures, normalized by the population of individuals who have just reached
adulthood, is denoted by [µ1
t ;:::;µ
m(t)





Allowance must also be made for the fact that the population may be growing. Without loss
of generality, let the measure of all families at the start of period 0 be unity. By assumption
5, therefore, the measure of families at the start of period t(> 0) is






Consider the group of adults with human capital lk







The speciﬁc expenditures on this group require further differentiation; for some members
may receive subsidies and others none at all. In order to allow for this differentiation, and
with a slight abuse of notation, let each family in group k be indexed by ik 2 [0, 1]. With a






















































where ¯ Bt denotes the ﬁscal resources, such as foreign aid, arising from outside the system.
Two remarks on the relationship between (24) and (25) are called for. First, adult mortality in
periodt dependsonthelevelofspendingonmeasurestocombatthediseaseinperiodt. Since
revenues other than ¯ Bt depend, in turn, on the level of mortality, there is an apparently odd
form of simultaneity here: many of those individuals who survive the disease do so because
their survivalprovided part of the tax base, expendituresout of which keptthem alive. Unless
¯ Bt is so large as to permit the government to ﬁnance any desired package of measures in the
health domain, the indivisibility of a period and the impossibility of ‘storage’ therefore leave
one with an awkward difﬁculty. This can be overcome, however, by artiﬁcially splitting
each period into two. Suitably stiff taxes are levied in the ﬁrst sub-period in order to ﬁnance
measures in the health domain and to provide initial support for needy children, followed
by comparatively more modest taxation in the second, as the children grow up. The second
point concerns the relation between the efﬁcacy of spending in the health domain to produce
33public goods and the size of the adult population. Given the nature of AIDS and of human
behavior, it is plausible that a doubling of the population would require roughly a doubling of
spending in order to attain the same level of premature adult mortality, and this specialization
of (24) is incorporated into (25) above.
3.2 The Efﬁcacy of a Single Policy Instrument
In this section, we discuss the case where the government is unable or unwilling to intervene
in both the health and the education domains at the same time. The analysis of this case will
not only yield insights into the costs imposed by such a limitation, but it will also be helpful
in the design of a comprehensive policy program, in which the interplay of both kinds of
interventions plays an important role.
3.2.1 Education Policy
We ask what can be accomplished through subsidies alone, taking the disease environment,
represented by the vector [p(1);p(2);p(3);p(4)]; as given and constant following the out-
break of the disease in period 0: No measures are undertaken to combat the disease, presum-
ably because they are deemed to be ineffective.
Our ﬁrst result is that even when the government is limited to promoting education, there are
conditions under which a long-run collapse can be avoided. In order to show this, we assume
that the society is in a state of backwardness when it is assailed by the disease. The argument
then holds for any starting value l0 ¸ 1.
We begin with the following set of assumptions, under which an escape from backwardness
may be possible, even in the face of premature adult mortality.
Assumption 11.
a[z(2)f(1)La(2;k)+1]¡aLa(2;k) ¸ tba
34The assumption states that if a child reared in a single-parent family whose adult possesses
human capital La(2;k) is fully educated, then that child, on becoming a single parent, can
pay at least tba while also choosing to educate his or her own children fully. Recall that by
deﬁnition, such a child will indeed receive a full education if the family pays no net taxes.
Assumption 11 is equivalent to
a[(z(2)f(1)¡1)La(2;k)+1] ¸ tba (27)
Since z(2)f(1) ¸ 1 is a necessary and sufﬁcient condition for unbounded growth to be pos-
sible in the absence of premature adult mortality, and since La(2;k) > l0 = 1, inspection of
(22) reveals condition (27) to be a very modest requirement.





¢1+1 = La(2;k)+tba=a (28)
Since the net income of adults in a household a+ ¯ g¡tba matters for the choice of education,
e0 is now written as a function of net income. This assumption states that the combination
of the educational technology and the transmission factor z(2) is strong enough to yield a
bounded transfer g (gross of the tax tba) that will induce a single-parent family whose adult
human capital is unity to choose an e0 2 (0;1) such that its children will attain the level of
human capital La(2;k)+tba=a. Note that g is a gross subsidy since the single-parent family
pays taxes tba:
Finally, we appeal to the existence of satisfactory institutional arrangements for the care and
education of full orphans, whereby the cost per child may be larger than that corresponding
to the family transfer g. The following assumption allows, in principle, a solution to this
social problem if ﬁscal resources are large enough over some sequence of periods.
Assumption 13. Full orphans can be supported in such a way that they can attain a level of
human capital of at least La(2;k) as adults.
In order to complete the preliminaries, we introduce some additional notation. Let dt 2 [0;1]
35denote the share of all Nt families that receive the gross subsidy ¯ g in period t. Moreover, let
dt(st) 2 [0;1] denote the corresponding share of all households of type st that receive some
form of support in period t.
The following result establishes that all children can be fully educated from some point in
time onwards.
Proposition 3
Suppose a society in a general state of backwardness is assailed by an epidemic at the start of
period 0, which induces the state-vector [p(1), p(2), p(3), p(4)] from then onwards. Suppose
also that assumptions 11 – 13 hold. Then, if (1¡p(4))z(2)f(1) > 1 , there exists a sequence
of taxes and transferssuch that all individuals will enjoy full education within a ﬁnite number
of periods.
The proof, which is constructive, is given in the appendix. It should be noted that if, on
the contrary, (1¡p(4))z(2)f(1) < 1, the tax revenues from all groups ‘promoted’ to the
condition e = 1 will eventually grow more slowly than the population, given the requirement
that both one- and two-parent families are to choose e=1 after promotion. Since the fraction
(1¡p(4)) of all children become full orphans in each period, it is not clear that all can be
fully educated when the condition (1¡p(4))z(2)f(1) > 1 does not hold.
Turning to the effects of premature adult mortality on the behavior of output over the long
run, it is obvious that aggregate output in every period is strictly greater in the complete
absence of such mortality than in its presence. What is of keener interest, however, is to
establish whether an increase in such mortality reduces the long-run rate of growth of out-
put below the value [2z(1)f(1)¡1], which is the rate that would obtain if there were no
premature adult mortality at all.
In order to answer this question, we begin by noting from proposition 3 that there is a policy
under which all children will enjoy full-time schooling by the start of period t, say. At
this juncture, there will be a discrete distribution of the levels of individual adults’ human
36capital, the vector of which is denoted by [l1
t ;:::;l
m(t)
t ], where the elements are arranged in
ascending order and, in view of assumption 13, l1
t = La(2;k). The vector of corresponding
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t is the corresponding average at the start of period t. Hence, the










If [p(1)2z(1)+(p(2)+p(3))z(2)]f(1)>1, this aggregate will grow without limit. By virtue
of assumption 2, this is a weaker condition than [1¡p(4)]z(2)f(1) > 1 whenever z(1) >
z(2)=2. Since we are concerned with a comparison of long-term growth rates, we therefore
assume that [p(1)2z(1)+(p(2)+p(3))z(2)]f(1) > 1. It is clear from (28) that Kt grows at
the asymptotic rate of
[p(1)2z(1)+(p(2)+p(3))z(2)]f(1)¡1 < 2z(1)f(1)¡1
whenever there is any premature adult mortality.
Now, this result is an immediate consequence of assumption 13, which implies that a ﬁxed
proportion p(4) of all adults will attain the (ﬁxed) level of human capital La(2;k) at the start
of each period after period t. We therefore modify assumption 13 conditionally as follows:
37Assumption 13(a). Under conditions of long-run growth in productivity, full orphans in
periodt can be supported in such a way that they attain xKt+1 as adults in periodt+1, where
x · 1:
It should be remarked that it is very plausible that full orphans do rather less well, on aver-
age, than their cohort: equivalently, that x < 1. Be that as it may, it follows from (28) and




which is less than 2z(1)f(1)¡1: Recalling assumption 2, we have obtained the following
result:
Proposition 4
If [p(1)2z(1)+(p(2)+p(3))z(2)]f(1) > 1¡xp(4) and (1¡p(4))z(2)f(1) > 1 under the
ﬁxed state-vector [p(1);p(2);p(3);p(4)]; then unbounded long-run growth is feasible. Any
premature adult mortality will result in a lower rate of growth of human capital, and hence
of output, over the long run if either of the conditions x = 1 and z(1) = z(2)=2 is violated.
There will be no such reduction if and only if both x = 1 and z(1) = z(2)=2 hold.
It is very plausible that premature adult mortality has an adverse effect on the growth rate
of aggregate output, even when the condition of long-run growth remains attainable. This
condition may not be reached at all, however, if the condition (1¡p(4))z(2)f(1) > 1 is
strongly violated; for then the condition of universal full education, on which the above
argument rests, may not be attainable. High premature adult mortality, as expressed in a
large value of p(4), may therefore destroy all prospects of long-run economic growth, even
when [p(1)2z(1)+(p(2)+p(3))z(2)]f(1) > 1¡xp(4); x = 1 and z(1) = z(2)=2 all hold.
Although propositions 3 and 4 suggest there are conditions under which concentrating re-
sources on the promotion of education can yield sustainable growth of human capital at an
7The details of the derivation are available upon request.
38asymptotically steady rate, it is generally the case that allocating at least some resources to
health is advantageous. Finding the right balance will be taken up shortly, but we ﬁrst look
brieﬂy at the other polar case, in which all resources are devoted to improving health, in the
sense of reducing premature adult mortality.
3.2.2 Health Policy
The ﬁrst fact is obvious.
Lemma 5
Suppose q > 0, so that k < 1. If there is a pure nuclear family structure, then for any level of
l0, health policy alone can delay, but cannot avert a collapse, i.e. limt!¥Pt = 1.
The lemma follows immediately from the second part of proposition 1, which holds for any
level of k < 1. If health policy cannot eliminate premature mortality completely, the society
slides back into backwardness over time. It would be a grave mistake, however, to put too
much weight on the signiﬁcance of lemma 5. Under other circumstances, health policy
alone can avert a collapse: the obvious example is full-scale pooling, which we will take up
later. But there are also more subtle and indirect forces which slow the descent into general
backwardness. For instance, as long as the share of orphans remains small, a majority of the
society may opt for a program of compulsory schooling of orphans, a measure which would
stave off a long-term collapse.
3.3 Double versus Single Targeting
In this section we investigate how ﬁscal resources should be allocated between education
and health, and how these resources should be concentrated on subgroups of the population
when both types of policies are deployed. In particular, we examine whether health and ed-
ucation support should be given simultaneously to subgroups of the society, at least initially.
39We distinguish between what we call double and single targeting. Under double targeting,
some needy families receive both the beneﬁts of spending on health and transfers to promote
education. Under single targeting, such families receive transfers at the start, and the beneﬁts
of health spending later. We discuss the cases of private and public goods in that order.
3.3.1 Health Spending is a Private Good
Since the most general case is extremely complex, we conﬁne ourselves to a representative
example. Recalling assumption 12, observe that if g is paid to a two-parent family in period
0 (L0(1) = 2), then its children will attain




Denote by t the largest tax that a two-parent household formed by such a child on reaching
adulthood could pay while still choosing e1 =1 for its children. It is clear that t¸tba, where
the equality holds if and only if z(1) = z(2)=2 and e0(1;tba¡g;2) = 1:
When spending on health produces a purely private good, in the form of a lower probability






1 if hli ¸ h;
p otherwise
The constant (p < 1) is the probability that an adult male or female will survive to old
age if spending on him or her should fall below h. Allowing spending in the amount h to
eliminate the risk of premature mortality altogether is a convenient simpliﬁcation. Note that
such mortality is independent across individuals in the present setting; for hli < h, it is also
identically distributed. Hence, for all p 2 [0;1];
[p(1);p(2);p(3);p(4)] = [p2;p(1¡ p);p(1¡ p);(1¡ p)2]:
40We concentrate on the following comparison of double targeting (DT) and single targeting
(ST) when the society is initially in a state of general backwardness. In period t = 0 one of
the two schemes is put into effect. In t = 1, the scheme chosen is completed for the families
targeted in t = 0, while DT is applied to the next targeted generation. In all subsequent
periods, we assume that an optimal scheme is used, but without specifying precisely how
that scheme operates. This allows us to concentrate on the comparison of DT and ST within
the ﬁrst two periods.
The following proposition states a sufﬁcient condition for ranking them:
Proposition 5
Suppose that a society in a state of general backwardness (l0 = 1) is assailed by a non-
communicable disease in t = 0. Suppose that assumptions 12 and 14 hold and that ¯ t > 2¯ h.






The proof is given in the appendix. Observe that condition (30) is necessary as well as
sufﬁcient if and only if both z(1) = z(2)=2 and e0(1;tba ¡g;2) = 1; for only then does
t = tba hold.
Proposition 5 has an intuitive interpretation. The higher the costs of promoting education
relative to those of reducing premature adult mortality, the more attractive is DT, since it is
relatively cheap to prevent the early death of adults educated in period zero. If, in contrast,
the costs of preventing premature mortality are relatively high, it is more efﬁcient to promote
education alone. The higher is such mortality, the more attractive DT becomes relative to
ST, since the waste of resources devoted to education becomes larger.
413.3.2 Health Spending is a Public Good
The preceding analysis can be adapted in a straightforward manner to the case where spend-
ing on health produces a public good. Analogous to assumption 14, we have
Assumption 15. Spending at least the aggregate amount ¯ hNt on public health in period t
eliminates the disease in that period; spending less has no effect on premature mortality,










Suppose a society in a general state of backwardness is assailed by an epidemic at the start
of period 0. Suppose also that ﬁscal resources in period 0 exceed h, and that assumptions
12 and 15 hold. Outside aid, if any, is small and available only in that period. Then DT is










The proof is given in the appendix.
To gain further insights into how the various factors inﬂuence the outcome, consider the
special case where t = tba. If h · (1¡p(4))tba, then condition (31) specializes to
B0 = tba+B0 > (h=p(4))¡tba;
where B0 is the amount of outside aid in period 0. The condition is equivalent to:
2tba+B0 > (h=p(4));
42which is independent of g. In the absence of outside aid (B0 = 0), the said condition reduces








The intuition is clear: the more orphans the disease creates, the more attractive is DT; for
under the above assumptions, DT eliminates the disease, and so preserves in period 1 all
the investment in education in period 0. Foreign aid in period 0, when public funds are
likely to be especially scarce, also works in favor of DT. This general conclusion provides a
foundation for using health policy from the start in the formulation of good policy programs.
3.4 Multiple Equilibria, Self-Fulﬁlling Prophecies and
the Credibility of Policies
Our model exhibits an important difference between education and health policies where the
role of expectations is concerned. While measures to promote education in the future do not
affect schooling choices in the present, measures that promote health in the future affect the
well-being of today’s children on reaching adulthood and thus inﬂuence parents’ schooling
choices today. As a consequence, parents’ decisions depend on their expectations about
future health policies, which, in turn, may depend on the education choices of all families
today, since the latter determine tax revenues in the future. It is not surprising, therefore,
that the model allows multiple equilibria and the possibility of self-fulﬁlling prophecies. In
particular, we may have time paths that lead either to a progressive collapse, or to literacy,
health and growth under the same policy schemes, whereby the expectations of agents turn
out to be correct along all possible paths. The reason is that the government’s ability to
combat the disease in the present depends on current tax revenues, which depend, in turn,
on parents’ education choices one period earlier, which depended, in turn, on the parents’
expectations about the government’s ability to undertake the necessary measures to suppress
the disease in the present. Hence, both vicious and virtuous circles are possible.
Sincetheexistenceof suchmultipleequilibriais animportantconcern inthedesign ofpolicy,
43and the credibility of future policies then becomes crucial, we identify in this section the
most important source of multiple equilibria and discuss potential ways of responding to the
resulting problems.
In the following continuation of the events following the outbreak of the epidemic in period
0, there is a lag in the government’s response. The epidemic claims its victims early on in
adulthood before any effective measures can be devised to combat it, so that the (ﬁxed) state-
vector [p(1);p(2);p(3);p(4)] prevails until period 1. From that point onwards, assumption
15 holds, and the government formulates a spending program and the tax structure to ﬁnance
it; there are no outside resources. Spending hNt on health, if at all feasible, takes priority
over transfers in all periods. Such a program will be called henceforth a PHE, for “priority
for health expenditures”.
In view of the heterogeneity that necessarily arises in period 0, when all adults start with l0;
and is perpetuated in period 1, it will be useful to introduce some additional notation. Deﬁne
l1(s0;k1) ´ z(s0)f(e0
0(L0(s0);s0;k1))L0(s0)+1; s0 = 1;2;3
l2(s1;k2;s0;k1) ´ z(s1)f(e0
1(L1(s1;s0;k1);s1;k2))L1(s1;s0;k1)+1; s1 = 1;2;3
Observe that if k1 = 1, then only s1 = 1 occurs. The next step is to deﬁne taxable capacity
in relation to csub, as in section 3.1. Recalling that the state-vector [p(1);p(2);p(3);p(4)]
prevails in period 0, deﬁne taxable capacity in relation to (23),normalized by the number of







s=1p(s) = 1, some rearrangement yields
Q1(k1)´a¢2k1[p(1)l1(1;k1)+(p(2)+p(3))l1(2;k1)]¡(1¡p(4))[2k1+(1¡p(4))n1b]csub:
44In keepingwith the question posed, we assume that 2z(1)f(1)>1;so that unbounded growth
per capita will occur if ht ¸ h for all t > 0: The following assumption states that if parents
expect the aggregate level of spending on health in period 1 to fall short of hN1, then the
level of premature mortality in that period, as represented by the statistic k1; is so great that
they will choose to educate their children in such a limited way that no child will attain the
corresponding critical value l¤(s0;k1) in period 1. Expressed formally, we have
Assumption 16.
l1(s0;k1) < l¤(1;1); s0 = 1;2;3:
Here, it should be recalled from part (ii) of lemma 2 that l¤(1;k) · l¤(2;k) = l¤(3;k): The
next assumption states that if, on the contrary, parents in period 0 expect the disease to be
suppressed in period 1, and hence that none of their children will die prematurely as adults,
then all will be so educated as to exceed the corresponding critical value when they reach
adulthood in period 1.
Assumption 17.
z(s0)f(e0
0(L0(s0);s0;1))L0(s0)+1 ¸ l¤(2;1); s0 = 1;2;3:
The following proposition establishes a sufﬁcient condition for the existence of two, self-
fulﬁlling expectations equilibria.
Proposition 7
In the setting described above, let the government commit itself to PHE. Suppose that as-
sumptions 16 and 17 hold, and that




Then, under rational expectations, there exist both
(i) a time path along which the whole society slides into the poverty trap, and
45(ii) a time path along which the disease is fully suppressed and the whole society enjoys
unbounded growth at the asymptotically steady rate 2z(1)f(1)¡1:
Proof: see appendix.
If h is not too large, condition (33) can always be ensured by choosing k1 sufﬁciently close
to zero.
Several remarks are in order. The multiplicity of paths a society can experience arises be-
cause the government’s ability to combat the disease depends on current tax revenues, which
depend, in turn, on the expectations of adults one period earlier about whether the gov-
ernment will be able to combat the disease effectively. Although the government is able to
commit to a policy scheme, its inability to commit to a speciﬁc policy, such as spending at the
level hN1, creates the possibility of self-fulﬁlling prophecies. As an immediate consequence
we obtain:
Corollary 1
Suppose that the government can commit to spend hN1 on combating the disease in t = 1.
Then, in the setting described in proposition 7, there exists a unique time path along which
the society enjoys self-sustaining growth.
The corollary illustrates the point that the government must be able to tap sources of rev-
enues other than current taxation, such as outside aid or world capital markets, to combat the
disease if that measure would avoid a vicious circle leading to a wholesale collapse. To be
effective such announcements must be credible.
4 Fairly Good Policy Programs
After these extensive preparations, we address not only the most important, but also the most
difﬁcult question confronting decision-makers: namely, what does the optimal sequence of
46expenditureandtaxpolicieslooklike? Ratherthanattemptingtocharacterizesuchprograms,
as is done in the related, but far simpler, setting of Bell and Gersbach (2002), we approach
the problem in the spirit of a strand in the literature on economic planning. This sought to
formulate and describe what were called ‘fairly good plans’, as a way of dealing with the
deeply intractable problem of ﬁnding a full optimum. The results obtained here will serve as
the basis for the analysis of the South African case in section 5.
As in previous sections, we begin with a homogeneous society at the start of period 0, which
is then struck by an epidemic. In keeping with the nature of the AIDS epidemic, public
spending on measures to combat it are treated as a public good, as in section 3.3.2. The
pre-existing social structure also has a profound inﬂuence on the right policy response. We
begin with nuclear families, and then turn to pooling.
4.1 Nuclear Families
A good response to the outbreak must cover two phases. The ﬁrst involves an attempt to
re-establish the conditions for sustainable growth after the dislocations caused by the initial
shock. The second involves maintaining those conditions in the face of a continuing epi-
demic. In other words, the ﬁrst phase is concerned with the so-called ‘traverse’ to a new
steady state and the second with the new steady state to which the traverse leads.
In the present context, one principal concern is with bringing about full schooling for all.
With this goal in mind, we deﬁne the taxable capacity of a household of type st whose adults
possess human capital Lt(st) as the largest possible tax that can be imposed on it without
violating e0
t (Lt(st);tt(st);st;kt+1) = 1 8st 6= 4. This tax is denoted by
¯ tt(Lt(st);st;kt+1) = maxf0;a(Lt(st)¡La(st;kt+1))g st = 1;2;3: (34)
Observe that t(¢) is increasing in Lt(st) 8Lt(st) ¸ La(st;kt+1) 8st 6= 4, and that for a given
level of the household’s human capital and kt+1;tt(st = 1) > tt(st = 2) = t(st = 3): Part
47(iii) of lemma 1 implies that higher premature mortality in period t +1, as expressed by a
decrease in kt+1, will decrease tt 8Lt(st) > La(st;kt+1) 8st 6= 4.
Where the relationship between premature adult mortality and public spending on measures
to combat the disease is concerned, we relax the special form in assumption 15 as follows:
Assumption 18. The probability pt(st) is a continuous and differentiable function of the
spending level ht with:
pt(st) = pt(ht;st);where p0
t(ht;1) > 0;p0
t(ht;st) < 0 8st 6= 1:
The direct dependence of pt(st) on t allows for the possibility that the disease environ-
ment may change over time, for example, following the outbreak of a new disease. Since
P4





t(ht;4) > 0: (35)
An additional implication of assumption 18 is that kt is an increasing, continuous and differ-
entiable function of the spending level ht, as can be seen at once from (8).
4.1.1 The Second Phase
We begin with the second phase of this policy program, since it is the easier of the two to
analyze. Consider, therefore, the situation in which, by hypothesis, the initial shock has been
overcome, in the following sense: at the start of period t, all adults are endowed with at least
la(2;kt+1) units of human capital. This implies, in particular, that all full orphans in period
t ¡1 were fairly well educated, in the sense that et¡1(4) is sufﬁciently close to unity. It also
implies that tt(st;¢) ¸ 0 for all st 6= 4, with a strict inequality holding in at least one case.
As in section 3.2.1, there is a discrete distribution of the levels of individual adults’ human
capital, the vector of which is denoted by [l1
t ;:::;l
m(t)
t ], where the elements are arranged in
48ascending order and, in view of assumption 13, l1
t = La(2;kt+1). The vector of correspond-
ing measures, normalized by the population of individuals who have just reached adulthood,
is denoted by [µ1
t ;:::;µ
m(t)
t ], with representative element µk
t, where µ1
t is at least p(ht¡1;4).
Since orphans are not taxable, the total revenue that can be raised in period t without violat-
ing e0









Turning to public expenditures, ensuring universal education cannot be accomplished with-
out a satisfactory system for raising orphans, a system whose exact nature need not detain us
here. For each orphan, let the cost of such care and education corresponding to assumption
13 be denoted by g(4). For simplicity, this cost is assumed to be independent of time. Let
the proportion dt(4) 2 [0;1] of all full orphans be educated so as to reach at least La(2;kt+1)









Nt ¸ 0: (37)
If, for any given kt+1, condition (36) is satisﬁed for dt(4) = 1 and ht = 0, then a policy of
full education for all is certainly feasible in period t, even when nothing is done to stem the
epidemic in that period.
This brings us to optimum policy. Deﬁne the residual revenue after ﬁnancing the care and
education of orphans, given expectations regarding ht+1 and hence kt+1 as:


































t(st = 1) > tk
t(st = 2) = tk
t(st = 3), (34) implies that ¶Qt=¶ht > 0. Hence, even if
Qt(0;ht+1;¢) < 0, there may exist a positive value of ht that does satisfy (36). Denote the
largest value of ht that satisﬁes (36) when dt(4) = 1 by h0
t . Then, by the deﬁnition of Qt,
we have the maximum feasible level of spending on health, subject to the constraint that all
children enjoy full schooling.
We now prove that the expenditure policy (dt(4) = 1;h0
t ;et(st) = 1 8st), in conjunction with
the tax policy described above, also yields the maximal value of Qt+1 when continued in
the same fashion in period t +1. First, note that children born into households with human
capital Lk




as adults in period t +1; and that they will actually do so under the said policy. Hence,
for any given ht+1, there is no other policy that can yield a higher taxable capacity of any
individual entering adulthood at the start of period t +1. The children in question make up
the following proportions of all adults at the start of period t +1 :
[pt(ht;1);pt(ht;2);pt(ht;3);pt(ht;4)]¢µk
t:
By maximizing ht; it is clear from tt(st = 1) > tt(st = 2) = tt(st = 3) and assumption 18
that the resulting proportions maximize Qt+1 for any given value of ht+1.
The above results may be summarized as:
50Lemma 6
If all adults at the start of period t possess at least La(2;kt+1) units of human capital and
some possess strictly more, and if h0
t is positive, then for any given kt+1, the expenditure
cum tax policy in period t described by the vector
Gt = [h0











is optimal in the following sense:
1. Aggregate human capital at the start of period t +1 is maximized.
2. All adults attain at least La(2;kt+1) at the start of period t +1.
3. Qt+1 is maximal for any given kt+1.
For the remainder of this section, we conﬁne ourselves to settings in which there are no
further changes in the disease environment after the outbreak of the epidemic at the start of
period zero. Let D 2 f0;1g denote whether the onset of the epidemic has occurred. Ex-
pressed precisely, we employ
Assumption 19. pt(¢) = p(ht;st;D), where D = 0 up to period 0, and D = 1 thereafter.
It should be noted that the level of premature adult mortality still depends on public policy
through the spending on measures to combat the disease once it has broken out. With the
help of this assumption, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 8
If the conditions for the validity of lemma 6 hold at time t, and if z(2)f(1) ¸ 1 , then
(i) the policy program described by the sequence fGt;Gt+1;:::g with ht+t0 = h0
t 8t0 ¸ 0
is feasible, and
(ii) it is dominated by the feasible sequence in which h is maximized in each period with
the static expectation that ht+t0+1 = ht+t0 8t0 ¸ 0:
51Proof :
Consider the set of all adults possessing lk
t at the start of period t. Given ht, the measures
of the subsets comprising the tax base are [p(ht;1);p(ht;2);p(ht;3)]µk
t. The children born
to the adults possessing lk
t at the start of period t will be sorted into the following groups of
adults at the start of period t +1:
² p(ht;1) with human capital 2z(1)f(1)lk
t +1,
² (p(ht;2)+p(ht;3)) with human capital z(2)f(1)lk
t +1,
² p(ht;4) with human capital La(2;kt+1).
Recalling assumption 2, it is seen that if z(2)f(1) ¸ 1, then the human capital of each of
those adults who were not full orphans in period t will exceed his or her parents’ level. Since
those who grew up as full orphans cannot be taxed if their children are to have full-time
schooling in period t +1, the total taxable capacity of the above groups in period t +1,
deﬁned in relation to the policy in lemma 6, exceeds their parents’ level thereof in period t
if the following two conditions are satisﬁed: ﬁrst, that the proportion of full orphans be no
larger in period t +1 than in period t¡ equivalently, that ht+1 ¸ ht; and second, that ht+2 ¸
ht+1. Suppose, therefore, that the government chooses ht+1 = h0




t ;¢) > ht+1 = h0
t , so that the sequence fGt;Gt+1;:::g with ht+t0 =
h0
t 8t0 ¸ 0 is a feasible policy program. In view of what it accomplishes, namely, full
education for all and the elimination of all danger that any lineage will slide into the poverty
trap, it also deserves to be called a ‘fairly good’ program.
It can be improved upon, however. For by making ht+1 a little larger than h0
t , the condition
1
Nt+1Qt+1(ht+1;¢) ¸ ht+1 will not be violated, there being some taxable capacity to spare,
even without taking into consideration the accompanying reduction in the burden imposed
by orphans, as expressed by p(ht+1;4): This adjustment will also increase not only aggregate
human capital at the start of period t +2, but also taxable capacity in that period. The same
52reasoning applies to all future periods.
In the light of section 3.4, it should be noted the credibility of the policy ht+t0 = h0
t 8t0 ¸ 0
is an essential element of a ‘good’ policy programm.
The fact that Qt+1 is maximal given kt+2 = kt+1 suggests that the argument used to prove
proposition 4 can also be used to establish sufﬁcient conditions for sustainable growth in the
present setting.
Proposition 9
Suppose z(2)f(1) ¸ 1: Then, starting from the initial conditions described in lemma 6, a
sufﬁcient condition for unbounded growth under the policy program fGt;Gt+1;:::g with
ht+t0 = h0




t ;3))z(2)]f(1) ¸ 1: (40)
Proof :
Note from (34) that taxable capacity as deﬁned in the policy Gt in lemma 6 is linear in the
aggregate human capital of the individuals possessing more than La(2;kt+1). With reference
to the group of adults possessing lk
t in period t, the tax base provided by their offspring in
period t +1 comprises a diverse group of families with the following measures: ﬁrst, there
are the children of two-parent families in period t, whose unions form the vector
[p(ht+1;1);p(ht+1;2);p(ht+1;3)]p(ht;1)µk
tNt+1;
with each adult possessing human capital 2z(1)f(1)lk
t +1, and second, there are the children
of one-parent families in period t, whose unions form the vector
[p(ht+1;1);p(ht+1;2);p(ht+1;3)](p(ht;2)+p(ht;3))µk
tNt+1;
with each adult possessing human capital z(2)f(1)lk
t +1. The aggregate human capital in




which exceeds that in period t, namely, [1+p(ht;1)¡p(ht;4)]lk
tµk






Now, it has been established in proposition 8 that if z(2)f(1) ¸ 1; then there is a feasible
sequence of policies such that ht+1 ¸ ht. It follows that a sufﬁcient condition for aggregate




t ;3))z(2)f(1)] ¸ 1;
that is to say, the weighted sum of the ‘growth factors’ of one- and two-parent households is
at least unity, where their weights are their respective probabilities of occurrence under the
policy Gt. The claim then follows at once from assumption 2, (34) and proposition 8.
It should be remarked that since the policy program fGt;Gt+1;¢¢¢g with ht+t0 = h0
t 8t0 ¸
0 can be improved on by somewhat increasing the said level of spending on measures to
combat the disease in period t +1 and thereafter, condition (39), while sufﬁcient, is not a
necessary condition for unbounded long-term growth. There is, however, a limit on how
much premature adult mortality can be reduced by such spending, which will surely run
into sharply diminishing returns well before premature mortality disappears – if that were
possible. The government will therefore ﬁnd good grounds for allowing private consumption
to grow at some point in the sequence.
544.1.2 The First Phase
Having characterized a ‘fairly good’ policy program and the associated sufﬁcient conditions
for unbounded growth once all children receive full schooling, we turn to the task of ana-
lyzing the traverse to this state, starting from period zero, when the society is homogeneous
and the epidemic is about to break out. Depending on the level of l0 and the expected level
of k1, achieving a traverse may entail taxation of one- and two-parent families on such a
scale as to rule out full-time schooling for their children. To allow for this possibility, the
deﬁnition of taxable capacity used above must be discarded. Let the tax on a household of
type s0 possessing L0(s0) be denoted by t0(L0(s0);s0). If there exists a positive t0(2l0;1)
that satisﬁes
z(1)f(e0
0(2l0;t0(2l0;1);1;k1))2l0+1 > La(2;k1); (41)
then, despite the outbreak of the disease in period 0, there will be some taxable capacity in
both periods 0 and 1, conditional on all the children of two-parent households in period 0
choosing full-time education for their own children in period 1. Put formally, we have
Assumption 20. For any k1 not too close to zero, l0 is large enough to satisfy condition (40).
The government’s budget constraint in period 0 takes the simple form
[p(h0;1)t0(2l0;1)+(p(h0;2)+p(h0;3))t0(l0;2)]¡d0(4)p(h0;4)g(4)¡h0 ¸ 0: (42)
Note that t0(l0;2) may be negative, in which case, it denotes a subsidy to all single-parent
households. Observe also that under assumption 20, (41) can certainly be satisﬁed by the
policy t0(l0;2) = d0(4) = 0 and h0 = 0.
We proceed by forward induction. Suppose there exist a non-negative h0 and a tax vec-
tor (t0(2l0;1);t0(l0;2)) that satisfy (41) and the condition L1(s1) ¸ La(2;k2) 8s1 when
d0(4) = 1. Recall that h0
t is the largest value of ht that satisﬁes (36) when dt(4) = 1. If
h0
t > 0, some families must be paying taxes, and lemma 6 and propositions 8 and 9 will
55apply from period 1 onwards. It is clear that the best chance of achieving the traverse in one
period is to chose a program of taxes and subsidies in periods 0 and 1 so as to make Q1 as
large as possible. To get around the difﬁculty that Q1 depends on h2, we impose the condi-
tion that h2 = h1, thereby bringing proposition 8 into play, and so ensuring the sustainability




subject to: (41), h0 ¸ 0, h1 ¸ 0, h2 = h1; d0(4) = d1(4) = 1 and L1(s1) ¸ La(2;k1) 8s1:
If the value of Q1 at the optimum is positive, the traverse can indeed be accomplished in one
period. Otherwise, some full orphans will go uneducated in period 0, thereby enlarging the
pool of children to be supported in period 1. That being so, the aim is to show that one can
ﬁnd a program that eventually yields a setting in which lemma 6 does apply.
The principles underlying the solution will be clear from an examination of the case where
the traverse can be completed in just two periods. By choosing not to educate all orphans
in period 0, the government creates a new need in period 1, namely, to support the children
of the uneducated adults who do not die prematurely, where the latter can be thought of as
the ‘backlog’ from period 0. Denote the required subsidy per child by g(s1), to allow for the
possibility that this will vary according to the state of the family. Then the aggregate subsidy








In order to calculate the total revenue collected in period 1, recall that the children of two-










respectively. Note that lk
1 in this case is simply l
s0
1 and we use the latter notation in this
subsection. Recalling that those ‘needy’ children who were supported in period 0 attain
La(2;k2), the total revenue so collected may be written as a special case of the general














Hence, the net ﬁscal resources available for spending on combating the disease, conditional
on all children being so supported, are








The policy problem therefore involves the following modiﬁcation of problem (42):
max
[h0;h1;d0(4);t0(s0);t1(s1)]
[ ˜ Q1] (48)
subject to (41), h0 ¸ 0;h1 ¸ 0;d0(4) 2 [0;1];d1(4) = 1 and L2(s2) ¸ La(2;k2) 8s2:











1(s1)] will yield a setting where lemma 6 and propositions 8
and 9 are applicable.
We now investigate problem (47) in some detail, eschewing the Lagrange method in favor of
an approach that yields more intuition about the trade-off between spending on education in
the form of subsidies and combating the disease in period 0 in the light of their contribution
to completing the transition to the desired setting in period 1. Since condition (41) will surely
bind at the optimum and there is some taxable capacity when h0 = 0, we investigate what
57will happen if d0(4) is increased slightly at the expense of h0. Such a shift will yield more
taxpayers in period 1 and fewer offspring of uneducated parents to subsidize in period 1. The








The drawback of this reallocation is that it will adversely affect the composition of the popu-
lation in period 1 where taxable capacity is concerned. The corresponding change in revenue
















where it should be recalled from assumption 18 that p0(h0;1) > 0 and p0(h0;s0) < 0 for
s = 2;3;4. The last term in parentheses expresses the fact that reduced spending on health
in period 0 entails more full orphans in period 0, and hence, if d0(4) stays unchanged, more
children of uneducated parents to subsidize in period 1.
The ﬁnal step is to establish how h0 responds to d0(4) at the margin, a relationship we
establish by differentiating (41) totally. Since (41) holds as an equality at the optimum, and
P4






















Since d0(4) can be increased only at the expense of h0 when the traverse lasts more than one












58Condition (49) states that a (small) unit increase in spending on health in period 0 must be
strictly greater than the combined increase in taxes and the saving of subsidies to orphans
that it brings about in that period. For otherwise, the said act of spending would at least
ﬁnance itself, and so warrant further spending.
To sum up, the functions p(h;s); (s = 1;2;3;4) represent the effectiveness of spending on
combating the causes of premature mortality among adults. If the derivatives p0(0;s0) are
sufﬁciently large in absolute magnitude, it will always be optimal to spend something on
such measures at the very outset, even at the expense of educating fewer orphans and dealing
with the ‘backlog’ later.
4.2 Pooling
We conﬁne our attention to the comparatively simple case of complete pooling, so that we
can use the representative family approach developed in section 2.3. Since all children are
raised and treated identically, targeted subsidies to promote education directly, which are
effective in a nuclear family setting, will be neutralized through reallocations within the
family sphere itself. As long as the social institution of pooling remains intact, all individuals
within a generation will be identical, and the government need choose only a poll tax on
surviving adults, say tt for each ‘pair’, in order to raise revenue. Since the measure of
all ‘pairs’ at the start of period t is Nt and the measure of tax-paying units is ktNt; the
government’s budget constraint in that period is:
ktNttt ¸ htNt;
whereby, in a system of pooling, all individuals will be treated in the same way. This is so
by deﬁnition when expenditures produce public goods, such as mass awareness campaigns;
but it is also a feature of this social arrangement where individual treatment, such as the allo-
cation of drugs, is concerned. In the absence of subsidies of any kind, the budget constraint
will hold as an equality, so that k(ht) = k(kttt): By virtue of assumption 18 and k(0) > 0,
59the implicit function theorem yields a unique, increasing function k(tt)8. In what follows,
we assume that k0(0) is large, as seems plausible in the case of communicable diseases.
Whether such a society with a constant level of nt can withstand the onset of an epidemic
depends on whether the human capital attained by the children can be held to at least the
level of their parents’ generation through the use of health policy alone. The evolution of
human capital is given by:
lt+1 = 2z(0;kt(tt))f(e0
t (2lt;tt;0;kt+1))lt +1 (51)
where lt is the human capital of an adult, and (c0
t (0);e0
t (0)) maximize EUt(0) subject to
[2+(ht=kt)b]ct(0)+a(ht=kt)get(0) = a[2lt +(ht=kt)g]¡tt:
Note that e0






t (2lt;tt;0;kt(tt))) lt +1
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Asufﬁciently large k0(0) ensures that t¤(lt) exists. Note that the deﬁnition of t¤(lt) assumes









then t¤(lt) is monotonically increasing in lt. For e0
t (0) < 1, however, the monotonicity of
t¤(lt) with respect to lt is not assured without further assumptions regarding the shape of
the functions f and e0
t (0). We obtain:
Proposition 10



















l0+1 > l0; (52)
8Notethatourformulationimpliesasimultaneouseffect, sincehealthyadultscanbetaxed, andtaxrevenues,
in turn, affect the mortality rate. The problem can be avoided without affecting our results by a sequential
dynamic approach also within periods, as discussed in section 3.1.3.
60there exists a sequence of tax and health policies ftt;htg¥
t=0 and an associated time path
flt;ktg¥








Proof of proposition 10:
Simply consider the policy scheme
ftt;htg¥




¢t¤(l0) ´ h 8t
We assume for the moment that this scheme is feasible. We will then show that this is indeed
so. Note that ht is constant under this policy regime, for the tax levied is constant over all
periods. Hence, kt = k = k(h); and the mortality proﬁle is time-independent as well.
Suppose that adults expect that kt =k in all periods. If condition (52) holds, they will choose
e0
0(0) such that under the policy t¤(l0) and k, l1 > l0. To ﬁnance h1 = h in period 1, the
government again levies t¤(l0), which is feasible, since l1 > l0. If adults now expect that

















= l1 > l0
Under expectations kt = k 8t, the argument can be applied repeatedly. Accordingly, in every
period, normalized health expenditures in the amount of h (hNt in aggregate terms) can
be ﬁnanced, and given the policy ftt = t¤(l0);ht = hg, the expectations of adults will be
correct. Therefore, there exists a time path under rational expectations such that a collapse
is averted.
Given this policy, it follows at once that there will be self-sustaining growth if the growth
factor 2z(0;k(t¤(l0)))¢ f(1) is at least unity.
61Several remarks are in order. First, the policy tt = t¤(l0) is not, in general, optimal. If
the goal is to maximize the long-term rate of growth of productivity, it will be necessary to
increase spending on health as lt rises in order to increase the transmission factor z(0;kt).
The right sequence of policies depends, of course, on exactly how the objectives are stated.
Forinstance, iftheaimistomaximizelong-termaggregateoutput(andthusaggregatehuman
capital), the optimal policy will involve minimizing the time needed to attain e0(0) = 1;
and subsequently maximizing kt in each period, subject to ensuring full education for all
children.
Second, note once more that expectations about future health policy, and thus about the
children’s survival prospects as adults, play an essential role in determining the effectiveness
of policies today. Expectations that mortality will be higher, and taxable capacity lower,
in the future, which in turn imply less generous health policies in the future, can be self-
fulﬁlling, even if health policies today are generous.
Third, the conditions stated in proposition 10 are sufﬁcient for its validity, but in view of the
possibility of multiple time paths, they may not be necessary.
In the next step, we provide the counterpart to proposition 10 when a collapse is unavoidable
and pooling is a drawback.
Proposition 11
Suppose that a pooled society with human capital l0 per adult is assailed by the disease at









then under any feasible tax and health policy scheme, the economy will collapse.
Proof :
The proof is straightforward. Even if agents expected health policy to be extremely success-
ful in t = 1(namely, k1 = 1); human capital would decline for any health policy chosen in
62t = 0. Repeating the same observation for subsequent periods yields the assertion.
The overall conclusion from this section is that pooling puts the society on a ‘make or break’
road. Since pooling rules out the promotion of education through subsidies targeted at par-
ticular subgroups, it can lead to a collapse, which might otherwise be avoidable, especially
if the disease causes quite severe mortality. In a less lethal disease environment, in con-
trast, pooling is a form of social organization that reinforces measures to combat the disease,
and so helps fend off the collapse that would occur under a nuclear family structure. On
the ‘make road’, the credibility of future measures to ensure low adult mortality is again of
decisive importance.
5 An Application to South Africa
5.1 Calibrating the Model
We begin with the fundamental difference equation (3), for which we need the parameters
z(s), the functional form f(e) and the boundary value of l. In view of the highly non-linear
nature of the system and the limited information available at this stage of the research, we
choose the form f(e) = e. Not only does that bring a welcome simpliﬁcation, but it is also
virtually unavoidable if estimation is to proceed. Two further remarks: since the unit time
period of the model is a generation, some care is needed when translating the annual ﬂows
reported in the available series into parameter values. With this aim in mind, and with two
overlapping generations, it is defensible to set the span of each at 30 years. Given that the
data are aggregate in form, we are also driven to the heroic assumption that the population is
otherwise homogeneous in the period leading up to the full-scale outbreak of the epidemic.
63Inspection of the series for GDP reveals that the period from 1960 to 1975 was one of fairly
steady and appreciable growth (see Figure 2). By this yardstick, performance thereafter has
been at best mediocre. Among the contributing factors were the two oil shocks, the sanctions
against the Apartheid regime and the restructuring following its collapse. We therefore con-
centrate on the early sub-period, viewing it as plausible initial basis for assessing how the
post-Apartheid economy ought to be able to perform over the long haul. Denoting calendar
years by the subscript k, and ignoring child labor, we obtain GDP in year k from (5) as
Yk = aLklk; (53)
where Lk and lk denote the size of the labor force and the average level of efﬁciency in that
year, respectively. Since the labor force series begins in 1965, that year is the initial starting
point for the calibration procedure.




1960 49:2¢109 0:406 n.a. n.a.
1965 68:4¢109 0:410 7:42¢106 9:22¢103
1970 90:6¢109 0:447 8:24¢106 10:99¢103
1975 113:0¢109 0:453 9:25¢106 12:23¢103
1980 127:4¢109 0:461 10:34¢106 12:32¢103
1985 132:4¢109 0:495 11:93¢106 11:10¢103
1990 144:7¢109 0:500 13:58¢106 10:65¢103
1995 151:0¢109 n.a. 15:29¢106 9:88¢103
Sources: World Bank (2002) and Barro and Lee (1996)
The next step is to anchor the system to l65. This can be accomplished by progressive
substitution using eq. (3), which involves the unknown parameter z and the series for et.
Although only quinquennial data on educational attainment are available (Barro and Lee,
1996), this is a small drawback in the present setting; for annual ﬂuctuations are of no real
signiﬁcance. The data take the form of the average years of schooling among the population
64aged 25 and older – for example, 4.06 years in 1960. Deﬁning ‘full schooling’ as 10 years
(6 to 15 inclusive), this yields an average value of e for those born between 1905 and 1935
of 0.406, which is denoted by eB
60. With 1965 as the starting point, and neglecting premature
adult mortality, we have
l70 = 2ˆ z eB
65 l65+1 (54)
and
l75 = 2ˆ z eB
70 [2ˆ z eB
65 l65+1]+1 (55)
where ˆ z is a suitable re-scaling of the parameter z to reﬂect the averaging effect of the stock
in relation to an interval of ﬁve years. Substituting for l70 and l75 in (52), we obtain three
equations in ˆ z;a and l65. The values of Yk;Lk and ek in Table 2 then yield ˆ z = 0:538 and the
preliminary values a = 6930;l65 = 1:330.
The estimate for ˆ z must now be translated into a 30-year setting, with corresponding ad-
justments to a and l0. The value of l95 can be obtained recursively from l65 = 1:330 and
ˆ z = 0:538 using the series for eB
k:
l95 = 2ˆ zeB
90[2ˆ zeB
85[2ˆ zeB
80[¢¢¢]+1]+1]+1 = 0:0147 l65+2:068 = 2:088:
By deﬁnition, eB
90 is the average schooling of those born between 1935 and 1965, who corre-
spond reasonably well to the population of individuals of school-age in 1965. Returning to
eq. (3), therefore, we have
l95 = 2zeB
90 l65+1 = 1:33z+1:
Hence, z = 0:818:
In estimating the associated values of a and l65, inspection of Figure 2 suggests that 1995
did not represent a normal year on the economy’s long-term growth path, and that 1990,
suitably scaled to allow for the shorter time-span of twenty-ﬁve years, would be a better
choice. That is, we obtain l95=l65 from (52) and Table 2, as follows:
l95=l65 = (l90=l65)30=25 = 1:189:
65Substituting z=0:818 into l95 =2zeB
90l65+1 yields l65 =2:696; and a=3419 then follows
from l65 = aL65 l65:
The ﬁnal step is to shift the starting point to 1960. At ﬁrst sight, this appears to be a nicety,
especially as the available data impose a calibration process anchored to 1965. As pointed
out in the introduction, however, the AIDS prevalence rate rose from about one per cent
in 1990 to just over 20 per cent a decade later. This is a strong argument for choosing
1990 as the date of the outbreak of the epidemic in South Africa, and hence 1960 as the
starting point in the chosen 30-year framework. The above interpolation from Table 2 yields
l95 = 1:189 l65 = 3:205, which implies that l grew at an annual rate of 0.58 per cent. This
yields, in turn, l60 = l65=(1:0058)5 = 2:620.
Some comments on these estimates are now in order. First, the parameter a has the dimen-
sion of 1995 US dollars per efﬁciency unit of labor per year. According to these estimates,
therefore, a two-parent household in 1960 with two economically active adults and all the
children attending school full-time would have had a family income of al60; or $17,915.
In the event of a complete collapse that left the entire population uneducated, the family’s
income would be just $6840 in the absence of child labor.
Second, a related aspect of this part of the calibration is the ratio of the labor force to the
total population. According to the World Bank’s Development Indicators (2002), this ratio
stayed constant, at about 0.37, until 1980, and then began to inch up, reaching 0.39 in 1995.
It will now be argued that this squares reasonably well with the model’s structure under
pooling, in which a representative two-parent family cares for (nt=kt) children. In 1960, the
total fertility rate was about four (WDI, 2002) and kt was about 0.80 (see below), so that
(nt=kt) was about ﬁve. The corresponding ﬁgures for 1990 were about three, 0.86, and 3.5,
respectively. Hence, if adults were to work throughout life and children not at all, as in the
model, the ratio of the labor force to the total population would be 2/(2 + 5) = 0.286 in 1960
and 2/(2 + 3.5) = 0.36 in 1990. Allowing for the model’s unit time period of 30 years, the fact
that many individuals started to work at ﬁfteen or so and were recorded as in the labor force,
66and that those over 64 accounted for only about three to four per cent of the population, the
calibration corresponds plausibly to the model’s assumption that both members of a couple
are economically active.
Third, the estimate of z yields the value of the intergenerational growth factor when children
attend school full-time, namely, 2z = 1:636: This corresponds to an annual growth rate of
productivity of about 1.64 per cent over the long run, which seems rather modest in the light
of the East Asian experience, but quite in keeping with South Africa’s recent performance.
All in all, there are grounds for some conﬁdence in the above method of calibration where
z;l60 and a are concerned.
Thus far, the form of social organization has remained conveniently in the background, but
now that preferences must be speciﬁed, a deﬁnite choice is unavoidable. For much of the
period in question, South Africa was quite rural, so one can make the case that there was
widespread pooling. This will be a salient feature of the benchmark cases to be analyzed
below. Let preferences be logarithmic, so that (16) takes the form
EUt = 2[alnct(0)+nt(kt+1=kt)lnlt+1]: (56)
Given that the calibration is anchored to 1960, we need both k60 and households’ expecta-
tions in 1960 concerning the level of k90. As noted above, the realized value of k90 was
0.86; but we have been unable to ﬁnd any estimate of k60. The great reductions in mortality
in those three decades beneﬁted children far more than adults, however, so that it seems de-
fensible to set the ratio of the expected value of k90 to the actual value of k60 equal to unity,
and this is our choice. At the time of writing, we have not tracked down any studies based on
microeconomic data that might yield a clue as to the value of a, so we are driven to another
strong assumption based on the aggregates, namely, that
e0(2l60;g = t = 0;s = 0;D = 0) = eB
90 = 0:5:
That is to say, in 1960, a representative ‘couple’, being unaware of, and untouched by, AIDS
in any way, is assumed to have chosen the average years of schooling attained by the gener-
67ation born between 1935 and 1965. This yields the value a = 33:45:
In order to complete the array of ‘economic’ parameters, we need estimates of b and g.
Setting b at a round one-half, like the judgement of Solomon, seems unobjectionable. A
much lower value of g is called for: g = 0:2 yields a maximal level of annual earnings from
a child’s labor of ag = $685, which may be on the high side, but we will stay with it for the
time being.
We now turn to the demographic components of the model. Fertility is assumed to be ex-
ogenous. The population roughly doubled between 1960 and 1990, so that in keeping with
assumption 5 and the generation-span of 30 years, each mother had, on average, four surviv-
ing children in that period. Whether AIDS will affect fertility in the future is unclear (some
evidence points to a modest decline), but what is certain is that AIDS has already contributed
to a marked rise in mortality among the under-ﬁves (Dorrington et al., 2001: 21). Since there
is also some evidence that fertility had started to fall by the early 1990s (World Bank, 2002),
we assume that each mother will have three surviving children from 1990 onwards.
Much more is known about the effects of AIDS on mortality, whereby our exclusive concern
in calibrating the model is with premature mortality among adults. The benchmark case is
that where there is no epidemic (D = 0), which, in view of the low prevalence rate in 1990,
is taken to be the age-speciﬁc mortality proﬁle for that year, as set out in Dorrington et al.
(2001, Figure 13:29). The second reference case is that where the epidemic has reached
maturity (D = 1) in the absence of any effective measures to combat it. The corresponding
proﬁle is assumed to be Dorrington et al.’s forecast for 2010. The only snag at this stage
is that these authors use what appears to be the demographer’s deﬁnition of premature adult
mortality, namely, death before the age of 60, conditional on surviving to the age of 15, the
probability of which is denoted by 45q15. This span does not suit our purposes; for although
entry into the workforce occurs at 15 or so, childbearing starts around 20, and death before
40 would almost surely deprive most or all the children of the parent’s love and care in the
later stages of childhood, if not the earlier ones. What is really needed, therefore, is either
68Table 3: Estimated sex-speciﬁc, premature mortality rates among adults
Year 45q15(M) 45q15(F) 20q20(M) 20q20(F) 30q20(M) 30q20(F)
1990 0.319 0.215 0.106 0.040 0.182 0.098
2010 0.790 0.790 0.359 0.541 0.616 0.707
Note: 45q15 for 2010 not given separately by sex in Dorrington et al. (2001, Table 5: 25).
20q20 or 30q20, whereby the latter corresponds exactly to the 30-year phase of economically
productive adulthood, but may be rather too long for the purposes of deﬁning the states
s = 2;3;4. In what follows, we shall use both, but we choose 30q20 as our reference case.
Estimates of these conditional probabilities have been obtained by using piecewise linear
interpolationsoftheproﬁlesinFigure13inibid. andapplyingtheproductrule. Theresulting
estimates in Table 3 make for grim reading.
The next step is to calculate the corresponding state-probabilities pt(st); a step that requires
an assumption about the incidence of the disease among couples. In view of how the disease
is transmitted, one is naturally tempted to assume that the infection of one partner outside the
relationship would soon be followed by the infection of the other within it, so that viewed
within a unit time-period of thirty years, single-parent households would become a rarity. In
fact, the probability of transmission within a union appears to be of the order of ten per cent
per annum under the conditions prevailing in East Africa (Marseille, Hofmann and Kahn,
2002), which, when cumulated over the median course of the disease from infection to death
of a decade, implies that the probability of the event that both partners become infected,
conditional on one of them getting infected outside the relationship, is about 0.65. This is
high, but still far removed from infection being perfectly correlated within a union. At the
present preliminary stage, we plump for simplicity by assuming that the incidence of the
disease within a union is i.i.d., an assumption we plan to relax in future work. The resulting
state-probabilities based on 20q20 and 30q20 are set out in Table 4, where it should be recalled
that they correspond not to the actual years shown, but rather to the steady states associated
with each disease environment (D = 0;1).
69Table 4: Family state-probabilities corresponding to premature adult mortality rates (30q20).
Year p(1) p(2) p(3) p(4)
20q20 30q20 20q20 30q20 20q20 30q20 20q20 30q20
1990(D=0) 0.855 0.739 0.101 0.164 0.039 0.080 0.005 0.018
2010(D=0) 0.294 0.112 0.165 0.180 0.347 0.272 0.194 0.436
The appalling dimensions – social, economic and psychological – of the epidemic in its
mature phase are plain to envisage. In its absence, it is safe to assert on the basis of 30q20 that
at least three-quarters of all children would grow up enjoying the care, company and support
of both natural parents, and fewer than two per cent would suffer the misfortune of becoming
full orphans. If the epidemic is left to run unchecked, then on the basis of 20q20, it will leave
about 20 per cent of the generation born from 2010 onwards full orphans, about one-half
will lose one parent in childhood, and a mere 30 per cent or so will reach adulthood without
experiencing the death of one or both parents. The proportions are even more dramatic if,
instead, one takes 30q20 as the basis. The epidemic will also reverse the usual pattern of
excess mortality among fathers – from about twice as high as among mothers to about one-
third to a half lower. Given the importance of the mother’s special role in securing the young
child’s healthy development, it can be argued that this reversal imparts additional force to
the shock.
With the reference cases thus deﬁned and numerically estimated, it remains to establish
the relationship between the state-probabilities and spending on combating the disease. In
keeping with the above procedure, this is accomplished by choosing a functional form for
the relationship between the probability of premature death among adults and the level of
aggregate expenditures on combating the disease, and then making the assumption that the
incidence of the disease is i.i.d. For simplicity, and erring on the side of optimism, we also
assume that such aggregate expenditures produce a pure public good, so that
q(D = 1) = q(h;D = 1); (57)
70where q(h;D = 1) is to be interpreted as the efﬁciency frontier of the set of all measures that
can be undertaken to reduce q in the presence of the disease.
It must be emphasized that while very little is known about the exact shape of q(:);q(0;D =
1)shouldyieldtheestimatesinTable3. Asecond, plausible, conditionisthatarbitrarilylarge
spending on combating the epidemic should lead to the restoration of the status quo ante,
that is, q(¥;D = 1) = q(D = 0): For reasons that will become clear shortly, it is desirable
to choose a functional form that not only possesses an asymptote, but also allows sufﬁcient
curvature over some relevant interval of h, so that the natural choice falls on the logistic:









q(¥;D = 1) = d¡
1
a
= q(D = 0): (60)
With four parameters to be estimated, two additional, independent conditions are required.
One way of proceeding is to pose the question: what is the marginal effect of efﬁcient spend-
ing on q in high- and low-prevalence environments, respectively? That is to say, we need
estimates of the derivatives of q(h;D = 1) at h = 0 and some value of h that corresponds
to heavy spending, when the scope for exploiting cheap interventions has been exhausted.
Matters now become decidedly more speculative. In order to obtain such estimates, we draw
on the estimated costs of preventing a case of AIDS or saving a DALY by various methods,
as reported in Marseille, Hofmann and Kahn (2002, Table 1). When the prevalence rate is
high, the most cost-efﬁcient form of intervention is to target prostitutes for the speciﬁc pur-
pose of controlling sexually transmitted diseases and promoting the use of condoms. The
associated cost per AIDS-case averted in Kenya is given as US $8-12. In the nature of things
and people, it seems reasonable to infer that this cost recurs annually. Other preventive mea-
sures are less cost-effective by a factor of up to ten or more. Marseille, Hofmann and Kahn
71put the average cost per DALY of a diverse bundle of such measures at $12.50, whereby
it may be remarked that, for these particular interventions, the assumption that h produces
a pure public good does not seem to be wide of the mark. Now, a reduction in q of 0.01
over a span of 30 years yields 0.3 DALYs.9 Allowing for the fact that there is ‘substitution’
among diseases, that is, if one does not succumb to AIDS, then there is always the threat of
something else, the expenditure of another $12.50 when h is small will yield a net reduction
in q(D = 1) of about (0:01)¢(1=0:3)¢(1¡q(D = 0)) = 0:028: Recalling that h is deﬁned
with reference to a population of adults whose measure has been normalized to unity, and









Following the purposive and determined implementation of the full battery of preventive
measures, the remaining intervention is to treat the infected. There is neither a cure now, nor
the prospect of any for perhaps decades to come. Opportunistic infections can, of course, be
treated in the later stages of the disease, and the onset of full-blown AIDS can be delayed
for a few years through the controlled use of anti-retroviral therapies. Such measures will
do little to reduce q as strictly deﬁned, but by keeping infected individuals healthier and
extending life a bit, they will raise lifetime income and improve the parental care enjoyed
by children in affected families. In the context of the model, therefore, it seems perfectly
defensible to interpret these gains as equivalent to a reduction in q. Marseille, Hofmann and
Kahn (2002) put the cost of saving a DALY by such means at $395, assuming that the drugs
take the form of low-cost generics and explicitly neglecting the costs of the technical and
human infrastructure needed to support an effective, so-called HAART, regimen of this kind.
This estimate must therefore be regarded as an optimistic one where the cost-effectiveness
of treatment, as opposed to prevention, is concerned. Be that as it may, it is assumed here
that HAART is the efﬁcient, marginal form of intervention when a low prevalence rate has
resulted from a determined, extensive and continuing effort at prevention. In order to com-
9The procedure for 20q20 is set out in section 5.3.1.
72plete the speciﬁcation of this case, it must be determined at what level of aggregate spending
HAART becomes the best choice at the margin. Note that in the absence of diminishing
returns to preventive measures, it would be possible to attain the status quo ante (D = 0) by
spending
[q(0;D = 1)¡q(D = 0)]¢(15=0:028) = 278:
In fact, diminishing returns will set in as the prevalence rate falls. Where preventing mother-
to-child transmission is concerned, for example, a drop in the prevalence rate from 30 to 15
per cent will almost double the cost of saving a DALY (Marseille, Hofmann and Kahn, 2002:
1852). Since 15 per cent hardly counts as a low level of prevalence, it seems fairly safe to
assume that HAART will not become cost-efﬁcient until spending on preventive measures
and the treatment of opportunistic infections is at least triple the above estimate. Granted







The four conditions (59) - (5.1) may be solved to yield the values of the parameters a;b;c
and d for males, females and both combined, as set out in Table 5. The associated functions
q(h;D = 1) are plotted in Figure 3.
Table 5: The parameters of the functions q(h;D = 1)
a b c d
women 0.6613 0.0051 0.4464 1.6101
men -0.6555 0.0034 0.1451 -1.3432
average 0.3562 0.4396 0.8145 2.9450
5.2 Benchmarks and Policies: Results
We formulate a set of variants designed to throw light on the efﬁcacy of policy when the
overriding aim is to avert an economic collapse following the outbreak of the epidemic.
73We begin by describing two benchmark cases, and then proceed to lay out three variations,
which are distinguished by the prevailing social structure and the available instruments of
intervention. The year 1960 corresponds to t = ¡1, for which an estimate of l has been
derived in section 1 in the form of l60, and 1990 to t = 0, at which point the disease breaks
out in all but the ﬁrst benchmark case.
The common feature of both benchmark cases is ‘pooling’, that is to say, all children are
valued and raised in exactly the same way within an extended family structure. Given the
number of surviving children born to each mother, changes in premature mortality among
adults affect only the number of children raised by each representative ‘couple’. The bench-
marks are distinguished solely by the absence or presence of the epidemic, there being no
interventions in either case. (The ‘normal’ programs of taxation and public expenditures are
already implicitly present in the process of calibration employed in section 5.1). Each gen-
eration is therefore completely homogeneous, epidemic or no epidemic. In this connection,
we add that we are keenly aware of the inequalities in South Africa, and that the appeal to
pooling is a merely convenient device to obtain a simple status quo ante. As we have seen,
AIDS provides its own powerful impulses towards inequality.
In keeping with the results on pooling in Section 4.2, the tax on each ‘pair’ of adults in period
t is chosen so as to maximize a child’s human capital on attaining adulthood at the start of
period t +1, all children being treated identically. In constructing the sequence fht;ttg
t=T
t=0,
it should be recalled that the condition tt¡1 · tt may not be violated; for otherwise, the level
of education chosen in period t¡1 will have been chosen on the basis of a falsely optimistic
expectation about mortality in period t. This consideration turns to be especially important
once e0
t =1 is attainable, since the effects of a reduction in taxation on the expected mortality
factor kt+1(= kt) may then be outweighed by the resulting increase in lt+1, with an ensuing
jump in mortality from then onwards. All pooling variations therefore involve sequences




t (2lt;tt;0;k(tt)))lt +1] s.t. tt ¸ 0;ht ¸ ht¡1 (63)
In order to solve problem (63), the form of z(0;k(tt)) must be speciﬁed, but very little
is known about it. Recalling the discussion in section 2.3.1 that yields assumption 8, we





(2z(1)+z(2))kt=2 if kt < 1=2
(2z(1)¡z(2))kt=2+z(2)=2 otherwise
(64)
which has a kink at kt =1=2. Note that in the special case where z(1)=z(2)=2, (64) special-
izes to z(0;kt) = z(1) for all kt ¸ 1=2 , which is the form chosen for all the cases analyzed
in this sub-section, where it will be recalled from section 5.1 that z(0;0:86) = 0:818:
The three policy variations are distinguished, ﬁrst, by whether the social institution of pool-
ing survives the increase in child-dependency that results from an increase in premature adult
mortality, and second, by whether it is administratively possible to subsidize families con-
ditional on their children attending school, as opposed to supporting them through general
lump-sum transfers. If the institution of pooling does withstand the shock, the collection
of taxes to ﬁnance selective lump-sum transfers will be at best harmless, and at worst posi-
tively damaging, through the deadweight losses so induced (though these are not explicitly
modeled here); for by deﬁnition, the community will fully undo all targeted redistribution
intended to bring about inequality. If, however, pooling breaks down, to be superseded by
nuclear families, then heterogeneity will emerge, and the targeting of subsidies to promote
education will become unavoidable in principle. In all three cases, there is an inherent trade-
off at the optimum between spending on measures to combat the disease and promoting the
formation of human capital directly by undertaking measures to promote education. Spend-
ing on health always takes the form of a public good.
755.2.1 Benchmark 1: pooling, no AIDS
The series flt;et;ht;kt;nt;ytgt=3
t=¡1 are set out in Table 6.1; the corresponding trajectory of
the variable lt, about which all else revolves, is plotted in Figure 4. The key features of
this story are that l0 > l¤(0) and that steady-state growth is ultimately attained. Starting
from the modest level of 0.5 in 1960, education becomes virtually full-time in the generation
born from 2020 onwards, by which point, income per head is two-thirds higher than in 1960,
with another 80 per cent increase to follow in the next generation. The burden of child-
dependency is limited throughout: 0.65 adopted children per ‘couple’ in addition to the four
of their own before 1990, and 0.49 in addition to the three thereafter. This is the relatively
happy, counterfactual, story into which AIDS intrudes at t = 0.
Table 6.1: Benchmark 1: Pooling, no AIDS
year l e h k n y(0)
1960 2.62 0.50 0 0.86 4.65 19,503
1990 3.14 0.64 0 0.86 3.49 22,335
2020 4.32 0.97 0 0.86 3.49 29,589
2050 7.86 1.00 0 0.86 3.49 53,724
2080 13.85 1.00 0 0.86 3.49 94,715
5.2.2 Benchmark 2: pooling, AIDS and no intervention
The consequences of doing nothing (t = h = 0 8t ¸ 0) are nothing short of disastrous. The
epidemic sets in train a complete collapse of both the economy and, almost surely, the so-
cial institution of pooling within a few generations. The extremely high level of premature
mortality among adults, as set out in Table 3, leaves the community relatively impoverished
from the start and with an intolerable burden of dependency, each surviving ‘couple’ having
to care for almost two adopted children for each one of their own. Education is correspond-
ingly neglected, with unrelieved child labor (e = 0) for the generation born starting in 2020,
76and the descent into backwardness (l = 1) is complete by 2050, when family income is a
little less than two-thirds its level in 1960, and there are almost twice as many children for
each ‘couple’ to care for. Can this fate be averted?
Table 6.2: Benchmark 2: Pooling, AIDS and no intervention
year l e h k n y(0)
1960 2.62 0.50 0 0.86 4.65 19,503
1990 3.14 0.20 0 0.34 8.87 26,366
2020 2.01 0.00 0 0.34 8.87 17,773
2050 1.00 0.00 0 0.34 8.87 12,901
2080 1.00 0.00 0 0.34 8.87 12,901
5.2.3 Policy option 1: spending on health under pooling
In Benchmark 2, the future of pooling, like everything else, is bleak. It could be, however,
that under the optimal program of spending on health, premature mortality among adults will
be sufﬁciently low as to keep pooling viable. We therefore maintain this as an assumption
and see what ensues when problem (62) is solved sequentially.
The results are qualitatively striking. The optimal level of spending on combating the epi-
demic immediately upon outbreak (t = 0) is $963, which corresponds to about 4.5 per cent
of GDP, rising to $1030, or 3.6 per cent of GDP in 2020, when productivity is 30 per cent
higher. Fiscally speaking, this is a tall order and a very substantial long-term burden; but if
it is politically feasible, it will eventually yield steady-state growth, with full and universal
education attained in 2050. With (optimal) spending at this level, premature mortality among
adults would be scarcely higher than in the absence of the disease altogether. A comparison
withBenchmark1, assetoutinTable6.1, revealsthatthecostsofdealingwithAIDSinterms
of lost output are modest at ﬁrst, but become quite large by 2080, when productivity is about
88 per cent of its benchmark level, even with the optimal package of interventions under the
77favorable conditions of the case considered here. The long-run rate of growth is unaffected
by AIDS under this policy program; for once full-time schooling is reached, the growth rate
depends only on z(0;k), which is constant, by assumption, at the value z(0;0:86) = 0:818:
Taking a somewhat broader view, therefore, the outcome is very encouraging, in that the gen-
eral qualitative character of Benchmark 1 is still attainable, including a relatively low level
of premature adult mortality (see Figure 5). Thus, the maintained assumption that pooling
will survive the shock is arguably validated.
Table 6.3: Policy option 1: Spending on combating the disease under pooling
year l e h k n y(0)
1960 2.62 0.50 0 0.860 4.65 19,503
1990 3.14 0.60 963 0.849 3.53 22,445
2020 4.10 0.87 1029 0.852 3.52 28,365
2050 6.83 1.00 1029 0.852 3.52 46,725
2080 12.18 1.00 1029 0.852 3.52 83,269
5.2.4 Policy option 2: nuclear families, lump-sum subsidies
One problem with the results under pooling option 1 is that they are predicated on the as-
sumption that the government acts at once to nip the epidemic in the bud. In fact, the epi-
demic had assumed alarming proportions by 2000, with many children already left as or-
phans and even more destined to become orphans, thus calling into question the whole sys-
tem of pooling. If the social institution of pooling does break down, leaving tightly deﬁned
nuclear families to emerge instead, then the government will be faced with the challenging
task, not only of averting a collapse, but also of preserving equality within each genera-
tion. In order to make this possible, we need additional assumptions about the formation
of human capital when children are left as half- or full orphans. Under the assumption that
z(1) = z(2)=2, that is, single-parents can do just as well as couples in raising their children
if the income is there, it is possible to preserve equality of educational outcomes among all
78children with at least one living parent by subsidizing one-parent families so as to induce
them to choose the same level of education as that chosen by two-parent families. By hy-
pothesis, no family takes in full orphans, so that these children must be cared for and raised
in orphanages. We assume that it is possible for these institutions, when properly staffed
and run, to substitute for parents perfectly, at least where the formation of human capital
is concerned. The operating rule is that each full orphan will also enjoy the same level of
consumption as a child in a single-parent household.
As argued in section 4.1, when the family structure is nuclear, a ‘good’ policy program to
overcome the shock caused by AIDS must ensure a substantial tax base, not only in the
present, but also in the next generation. The instruments available for this purpose are taxes
on two-parent households, spending on combating the disease, the size of the subsidy to
single-parent households and the proportions of half- and full orphans to be supported. They
are chosen subject to the above restrictions designed to preserve equality, if at all possible,
and to the government’s budget constraint.
Given the complexity of using full-scale forwards induction, as set out in section 4.1, we opt
here for a somewhat simpler approach, in which the aim is to maximize the expected size
of the tax base in the next period, where all parties hold the ﬁrm expectation that there will
be a continuation of the level of premature adult mortality (and hence of h) prevailing in the
present. That is to say, we resort to the assumption that there are stationary expectations, an
assumptionthat permitsthe maximization problem to bewritten so that iteffectivelycontains
no variables or parameters pertaining to the future. In particular, families’ decisions about
education depend on kt rather than kt+1. The (bounded) rationality of these expectations is
secured by imposing the condition that h not fall from one period to the next; for this we will
rule out policy programs under which the value of investments in education will be reduced
ex post by failures to take adequate measures against the disease in the next period. It should
be emphasized that if it is possible to stave off a collapse of the economy through a policy
program derived on the basis of stationary expectations so formulated, then it will certainly
79be possible to do still better by using the full apparatus of forwards induction. That, however,
is a step we leave to a later stage of the research.
Since all adults possess at least one unit of human capital, the tax base is deﬁned, for present
purposes, as the excess of the aggregate level of human capital over unity. By assumption,
all adults are identical at the beginning of period 0. If equality is preserved until period t, the
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subject to:
the instruments’ natural intervals, namely,
ht ¸ 0;tt ¸ 0;gt(2) ¸ 0;d(2) 2 [0;1]d(4) 2 [0;1];ht ¸ ht¡1;
the condition that all educated children enjoy the same level of schooling,
e0
t (2lt;tt(1);1;kt) = e0
t (lt;¡gt(2);2;kt); (66)
and the government’s budget constraint




where gt(2) is the subsidy paid to single-parent households and H is the number of orphans
each adult can care for in a properly run institution, each such adult receiving the going wage
per efﬁciency unit of labor. It should be remarked that the assumption that z(1) = z(2)/2 and
condition (66) together permit the maximand to be rewritten as
[p(ht;1)+dt(2)(p(ht;2)+p(ht;3))+dt(4)p(ht;4)][2z(1)e0
t (2lt;tt;1;kt)lt];
an expression which makes the trade-offs involved somewhat more transparent. If dt(2) =
dt(4) = 1; then the maximand specializes at the optimum to [2z(1)e0
t (2lt;tt;1;kt)lt]: By
80introducing the constant unity, one obtains the level of human capital attained in period t+1
by any child born in period t, as in problem (62). It should be noted, however, that the
form of the government’s budget constraint, (67), is not the same as that under pooling. The
difference between the two sequences then reveals the advantages of pooling.
It is a matter of great relief that the optimum sequence yields a continuation of growth with
complete equality, all orphans receiving the support needed to bring them up to par with the
children of two-parent households in each and every period. Growth is distinctly sluggish,
however, which points to a collapse that was somewhat narrowly averted. The (uniform)
years of schooling rise noticeably more slowly across succeeding generations than under
pooling, with full-time schooling achieved only in 2080, when the level of productivity is
only slightly more than double its value in 1990. Spending on combating the disease is also
higher in absolute terms throughout, and combined with the transfers required to support the
needy children, this yields a much heavier ﬁscal burden than in the pooling case. Two-parent
households pay a little over 20 per cent of their income to ﬁnance this program in 1990, and
ﬁnd small relief until rapid growth begins from 2080 onwards, and one-parent families need
less support.
These differences between policy options 1 and 2 call for some explanation. Recall that
under pooling, the objective is to maximize the (uniform) level of efﬁciency in the next
generation, whereas with nuclear families, it is the size of the future tax base that matters
when the government has to undertake the task of replacing the institution of pooling with
subsidies and orphanages. In the latter case, therefore, it may be worthwhile to trade off
educational attainment in order to secure more surviving adults at the later date. That is
exactly what has happened here: the absolute level of h is 14 per cent higher than under
pooling in both 1990 and 2050, despite the fact that the level of productivity under pooling
is 57 per cent higher in the latter period. The other contributing factor arises from the fact
that raising children in orphanages draws some adults out of the production of the aggregate
private good, a cost that does not arise (by assumption) under pooling. The upshot is that
81families have less disposable income than under pooling, so that their children receive fewer
years of schooling and growth is much slower. As under pooling, the long-run rate of growth
is unaffected by AIDS in this ‘fairly good’ sequence; but the traverse to steady-state growth
is a painfully long one.
Table 6.4: Policy option 2: nuclear families, lump-sum subsidies
year l e(1) e(2) h g(2) t d(2) d(4) k y(1)
1990 3.14 0.49 0.49 1101 2174 4223 1 1 0.854 22,536
2020 3.51 0.58 0.58 1127 2470 4607 1 1 0.854 24,887
2050 4.36 0.79 0.79 1179 3143 5466 1 1 0.854 30,228
2080 6.60 1.00 1.00 1179 2214 4707 1 1 0.854 45,136
5.2.5 Policy option 3: nuclear families, school-attendance subsidies
The results for this case are qualitatively similar to those under policy option 2, but with
the encouraging feature that growth is considerably more rapid. Given the efﬁciency of
school-attendance subsidies relative to lump-sum transfers, and hence the lower taxes on
two-parent households, one would expect a swifter attainment of full-time schooling in this
variant, and this is indeed the case here. The precise reasoning runs as follows: Choose the
optimal levels of taxes on two-parent households and spending on health under policy option
2. This program will yield the same demographic structure, the same level of education
among such families, and the same total tax revenues. The outlays under policy option 3
needed to induce the same level of education among the children of one-parent households,
however, will be smaller than under policy option 2. These children will also have a lower
level of consumption, a standard to which full orphans are tethered. It follows that there will
be an excess of total revenue over expenditures. Let h be held constant, so as to keep the
demographic structure unchanged, and let the taxes on two-parent households be reduced
slightly, which will induce a small rise in e(1). By continuity, there will still be enough funds
to ﬁnance the additional subsidies to half- and full orphans that will be needed to preserve
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that policy option 3 strictly dominates option 2 in all periods from t = 0 onwards.
It turns out that full education is reached in 2050, as is the case under pooling, though the
level of productivity is 12 per cent lower, due to the accumulated effects of lower attainments
in the two preceding generations. Spending on measures to combat the disease is a little
higher than under pooling at ﬁrst, but a little less from 2020 onwards. It is about 13 per cent
lower than its counterpart under policy option 2 throughout, so that more premature deaths
are implicitly accepted, though the differences in kt are small. A measure of the comparative
efﬁciency of conditional educational subsidies is that satisfactory growth is achieved with
amounts paid to one-parent households that are barely one tenth of the lump-sum transfers
made under policy option 2. The tax burden on two-parent households is correspondingly
lighter: the absolute payment per household is a little less than one-half of that under policy
option 2 in 1990, rising to 56 per cent in 2080. The difference in productivities is very large
at the latter date, namely, 2z(1) to one, or 1.636, which implies a much lower relative tax
burden. The latter falls from about 8.6 per cent of income in 1990 to 3.6 per cent in 2080
under policy option 3, and from 19.3 per cent to 10.4 per cent under policy option 2.
Table 6.5: Policy option 3: nuclear families, school-attendance subsidies
year l e(s) e(s) h g(2) t d(2) d(4) k y(1)
1990 3.14 0.57 0.57 973 280 1886 1 1 0.850 22,337
2020 3.91 0.78 0.78 1022 289 2101 1 1 0.852 27,220
2050 5.99 1.00 1.00 1022 197 2310 1 1 0.852 40,960
2080 10.80 1.00 1.00 1022 0 2642 1 1 0.852 73,839
5.3 Other Variations and Robustness
Some reﬂection on the results presented in section 5.2 suggests that three aspects of the
model’s calibration need to be examined in greater detail, with the object of establishing
83howrobustthoseﬁndings are to changesin parameter valuesand speciﬁcation. These aspects
concern the level of premature adult mortality, the dependence of the transmission factor z
on family structure and size, and the distinct possibility that the epidemic is well on the way
to reaching a mature phase before anything is done to bring it under control. The following
sections deal with each in turn, as separate variations on the constellation of parameters that
deﬁnes the base-case settings in section 5.2.
5.3.1 Mortality
As already indicated in section 5.1, one can argue that 20q20 is a better statistic of premature
adult mortality than 30q20 where the effects of such mortality on the prevalence of orphans
and the associated burden of caring for them are concerned. Its drawback is that in a structure
with an indivisible 30-year period, it leads to a strong under-estimate of the loss of lifetime
income arising from mortality among all adults in the economically active age-groups. On
balance, the use of 20q20 instead of 30q20 is probably a step away from a conservative stance
where estimating the effects of the epidemic are concerned; but some results are reported
here.
The estimation of q(h;D=1) proceeds essentially as in section 5.1. The steps involving (59)
and (60) are unchanged, but some care is needed with (61), since 20q20 clearly understates the
extent of premature adult mortality where the effects on output and income are concerned.
We therefore make a suitable adjustment to the number of DALYs saved through a reduction
of q. Now, a reduction of 0.01 therein over 20 years yields 0.2 DALYs, as opposed to 0.3









for males; the corresponding value for females is ¡0:048=15: The fourth condition involves
an intermediate step, which yields values of 85 and 157 for males and females, respectively.














These four conditions yield the functions q(h) graphed in Figure 6.
Despite the drastic reduction in mortality that is entailed in switching from 30q20 to 20q20,
both the benchmarks and the three policy options yield results that are qualitatively similar
to those reported in section 5.2, as can be seen comparing Figures 7 and 8 with their coun-
terparts ﬁgures 3 and 4, respectively. In the absence of intervention, there is still a collapse,
albeit a slower one, and the long-tun costs of the disease are cumulatively large, even with
intervention, though less daunting than those under 30q20:
The other aspect of mortality that needs to be addressed is whether something close to the
status quo ante can be achieved. In this connection, a striking feature of the results in section
5.1 is that the levels of spending in the policy sequences are so high as to keep the disease
almost fully suppressed, as measured by the difference between the statistic kt and k(D=0):
This could be regarded as a rather optimistic assessment of the position. A simple alternative
is to rule out such a close approach to the status quo ante by raising the lower asymptote of
the function q(ht; D = 1), so that (59) becomes
q(¥;D = 1) = d¡1=a = Aq(D = 0); A ¸ 1:
In what follows, we set A equal to 1.1. The corresponding functions q(ht;D=1) are depicted
in Figure 9.
This less tractable disease environment than its counterpart in section 5.2 induces slightly
higher spending under all three policy options, as intuition suggests it should. It is seen from
Tables 7.1-7.3 that k falls only a little, from 0.852 to 0.837 under pooling, from 0.855 to
0.842 under policy option 2, and from 0.852 to 0.837 under policy option 3. Yet its effects
85on human capital accumulation and output, while very small at ﬁrst, make themselves felt
by 2080. Under pooling, the level of human capital is then just over four per cent lower
than its counterpart in section 5.2.3 and 16 per cent lower than in the absence of the disease.
The corresponding ﬁgures for policy option 2 are much more striking, at 19 and 62 per cent,
respectively, and full-time schooling for all is still not quite attained at that date. Those for
policy option 3, namely, eight and 27 per cent, lie in between, a further testament to the gains
from targeting in this context.
Table 7.1: Variation 1: Benchmark 1: Pooling
year l e h k n y(0)
1960 2.62 0.50 0 0.860 4.65 19,503
1990 3.14 0.59 973 0.835 3.59 22,492
2020 4.04 0.84 1038 0.837 3.59 28,019
2050 6.53 1.00 1038 0.837 3.59 44,632
2080 11.68 1.00 1038 0.837 3.59 79,845
Table 7.2: Variation 1: Policy option 2: nuclear families, lump-sum subsidies
year l e(s) e(s) h g(2) t d(2) d(4) k y(1)
1990 3.14 0.47 0.47 1113 2066 4546 1 1 0.840 22,581
2020 3.40 0.53 0.53 1133 2264 4841 1 1 0.840 24,227
2050 3.96 0.67 0.67 1172 2692 5471 1 1 0.840 27,783
2080 5.32 0.99 0.99 1248 3733 6976 1 1 0.842 36,416
Table 7.3: Variation 1: Policy option 3: nuclear families, school-attendance subsidies
year l e(1) e(2) h g(2) t d(2) d(4) k y(1)
1990 3.14 0.55 0.55 980 277 2046 1 1 0.835 22,413
2020 3.82 0.73 0.73 1025 285 2266 1 1 0.837 26,693
2050 5.59 1.00 1.00 1025 247 2250 1 1 0.837 38,237
2080 10.15 1.00 1.00 1025 0 2911 1 1 0.837 69,385
865.3.2 The transmission factor z
Thus far, we have maintained the special assumption that z(0) = z(1) = z(2)=2: This, too, is
arguably on the optimistic side, so we now allow parents to be complementary, to a degree,
in the task of raising their children. Let z(1) = 0:6z(2); that is to say, ceteris paribus, two
parents are 20 per cent better than one where the formation of human capital is concerned.






1:537kt if kt < 1=2
0:698+0:138kt otherwise
(69)
The effects of replacing z(0;kt) = z(1) = z(2)=2 = 0:818 with the values just derived are as
follows. Starting with pooling, the qualitative picture differs not at all from its counterpart
in section 5.2, but there are some quantitative differences. In the second benchmark, when
nothing is done to combat the disease, the descent into the poverty trap is even swifter than
in section 5.2.2 (see Table 8.0); for the burden of caring for so many children now makes
itself felt also through a reduction in z(0;k), the upper branch of (69) being in effect. Under
policy option 1, the dependence of the transmission factor on k (and hence h) yields slightly
higher spending on health than in section 5.2.3, and the associated increase in taxes exercises
a slight dampening effect on the growth of l (see Table 8.1).
Table 8.0: Variation 2: Benchmark 2: Pooling, AIDS and no intervention
year l e h k n y(0)
1960 2.92 0.50 0 0.860 4.65 19,503
1990 3.14 0.09 0 0.338 8.67 26,988
2020 1.30 0.00 0 0.338 8.67 14,975
2050 1.00 0.00 0 0.338 8.67 12,901
2080 1.00 0.00 0 0.338 8.67 12,901
Turning to nuclear families and policy options 2 and 3, the replacement of the assumption
87Table 8.1: Variation 2, Policy Option 1: Spending on combating the disease under pooling
year l e h k n y(0)
1960 2.62 0.50 0 0.860 4.65 19,503
1990 3.14 0.60 972 0.850 3.53 22,446
2020 4.09 0.87 1034 0.852 3.52 28,323
2050 6.80 1.00 1034 0.852 3.52 46,511
2080 12.11 1.00 1034 0.852 3.52 82,817
z(1) = z(2)=2 with z(1) = 0:6z(2) necessitates a modiﬁcation of the maximization problem
if equality of human capital within a generation is to be preserved. We therefore replace (65)
with
2z(1)e0
t (2lt;tt(1);1;kt)lt +1 = z(2)e0
t (lt;¡gt(2);2;kt)lt +1; (70)
or, when z(1) = 0:6z(2);
1:2e0
t (2lt;tt(1);1;kt) = e0
t (lt;¡gt(2);2;kt): (71)
Since et 2 [0;1], it follows at once from (71) that equality in human capital can be preserved
as long as e0
t (2lt;tt(1);1;kt) · 1=1:2. Once this condition is violated, the disadvantages
of having only one parent, as expressed by z(1) > z(2)=2; cannot be overcome by policy
interventions.
With this modiﬁcation of (65), we obtain the series in Tables 8.2 and 8.3 for policy options
2 and 3, respectively. Under policy option 2, the condition 1:2e0
t (1) = e0
t (2) is maintained
until 2080, so that inequality appears ﬁrst in 2110. Spending on health is still heavier than
in section 5.2.4; so, too, are the subsidies to one-parent families and the taxes on those with
two parents, since e0
t (2) > e0
t (1) must hold for as long as possible. As a result, the growth
of l suffers: in 2080, its level is 17 per cent lower than in section 5.2.4, and only 75 per cent
higher than in 1990.
88Table 8.2: Variation 2: Policy option 2: nuclear families, lump-sum subsidies
year l e(1) e(2) h g(2) t d(2) d(4) k y(1)
1990 3.14 0.46 0.55 1134 3064 5217 1 1 0.855 22,597
2020 3.42 0.53 0.63 1154 3359 5580 1 1 0.855 24,345
2050 4.02 0.67 0.80 1192 4000 6363 1 1 0.856 28,151
2080 5.48 0.99 1.00 1296 5581 8265 1 1 0.856 37,527
Table 8.3: Variation 2: Policy option 3: nuclear families, school-attendance subsidies
year l e(1) e(2) h g(2) t d(2) d(4) k y(1)
1990 3.14 0.57 0.68 978 345 1980 1 1 0.850 22,374
2020 3.99 0.80 0.96 1031 354 2250 1 1 0.852 27,698
2050 6.34 1.00 1.00 1031 176 2334 1 1 0.852 43,324
Underpolicyoption3, however, growthisfasterthaninsection5.2.5, eventhoughtaxationof
two-parent families is higher. The reason for this happy result is that the potential advantages
stemming from z(1) > z(2)=2 are not overwhelmed by the weight of taxes needed to ensure
equality when subsidization is so efﬁciently achieved. In 2020, l is 1.9 per cent higher than
its counterpart in section 5.2.5, and both e(1) and e(2) exceed their (common) counterpart
values. In 2050, there is still no inequality in l among adults, and the common level of
6:34 is now markedly higher than that in section 5.2.5. Thereafter, inequality sets in, as
e0
2050(1) = 1.
5.3.3 A delayed policy response
In the ‘base-case’, as deﬁned in section 5.2, the outbreak of the disease at the start of pe-
riod 0 is recognized at once, and an appropriate package of measures to combat it is also
implemented without delay. This is one, rather optimistic, extreme possibility. At the other
extreme in this 30-year framework is the possibility that nothing at all is, or can be, done to
stem the epidemic until the beginning of period 1. In effect, h0 is constrained to be zero, and
89public intervention is limited to promoting education and caring for orphans when the family
structure is nuclear.
Such a lag in policy response is arguably fatal under pooling. This can be seen at once
by noting from Table 6.2 that the value of l1(0), namely, 2.01, lies just below the value of
l¤(0;0:86), namely, 2.143. That is to say, if, at the start of period 0, extended families expect
the level of k0(= 0:338) to prevail also in period 1, they will choose a level of schooling for
their children such that l1(0) lies below even the critical level of l that corresponds to the
disease disappearing for good in period 1, namely, l¤(0;0:86), let alone the critical level that
corresponds to an unabated continuation of the epidemic, namely, l¤(0;0:338), the value of
which is 5.60. This is conﬁrmed by the series in Table 9.1: 2020 sees a slight recovery in
e, but the shock is too great and l continues to decline, despite heavy (optimal) spending
on measures to combat the disease, which keeps k at 0.844. By 2080, full-time child labor
rules, with ‘backwardness’ to follow one generation later. This is a sobering illustration of
the second part of proposition 2.
Table 9.1: Variation 3, Policy Option 1: Spending on combating the disease under pooling
year l e h k n y(0)
1960 2.62 0.50 0 0.860 4.65 19,503
1990 3.14 0.19 0 0.338 8.87 26,366
2020 2.00 0.24 853 0.844 3.55 15,563
2050 1.78 0.15 853 0.844 3.55 14,236
2080 1.44 0.00 853 0.844 3.55 12,261
It might be argued that the assumption of stationary expectations in this setting is both im-
plausible and too pessimistic. Despite the shocking level of premature adult mortality in
period 0 (k0 = 0:338), the surviving parents might anticipate a successful campaign to con-
tain the disease in period 1 and educate all the children in their care accordingly. To explore
this case, we set k1 =0:84 (a little lower than the level of 0:86 prevailing in the absence of the
disease) and allow the system to evolve according to the program set out in earlier sections
90thereafter. This change brings about strikingly different results. For all the burden of raising
nearly nine children – as opposed to the three or four in section 5.2.3 – each couple chooses a
even higher level of education for each one of them – 0.67 as opposed to 0.60. Expectations
concerning low mortality in period 1 are more than fulﬁlled, and growth is even more rapid
than when there is no delay.
Table 9.2: Variation 3, Policy Option 1: Forward-looking Expectations
year l e h k n y(0)
1990 3.14 0.67 0 0.34 8.87 23,498
2020 4.44 0.96 1048 0.85 3.52 30,439
2050 7.95 1.00 1048 0.85 3.52 54,369
2080 14.01 1.00 1048 0.85 3.52 95,773
These results, too, invite skepticism; for the degree of selﬂessness and altruism implicit in
the speciﬁcation of preferences in (17) when there are almost two adopted children in the
‘family’ for every natural child borders on saintliness. As a further possibility, therefore, let
us return to Lemma 4, in which all children must be treated identically, but surviving adults
value only the future human capital attained by their natural children. We set k1 = 0:84, and
reinstate altruism towards adopted children from 2020 onwards. This yields the following
utility speciﬁcations:
1990 : EUt(0) = 2[u(ct(0))+nt ¢0:84 v(2z(0;kt)f(et)lt +1)]
2020¡2080 : EUt(0) = 2[u(ct(0))+nt(kt+1=kt) v(2z(0;kt)f(et)lt +1)]
The withdrawal of all feelings of altruism towards adopted children under the burden of
dependency in period 0, coupled with the social necessity of treating all children alike, leads
to an economic collapse, and even more swiftly than when altruism is maintained under
stationary expectations, as is seen by comparing Tables 9.1 and 9.3. It is most doubtful that
surviving parents would in fact continue to treat their natural children no differently from
91Table 9.3: Variation 3, Policy Option 1: Forward-looking Expectations and Limited Altruism
towards Adopted Children when Adoption Rates are High
year l e h k n y(0)
1990 3.14 0.14 0 0.34 8.87 26,718
2020 1.71 0.12 814 0.84 3.57 13,817
2050 1.33 0.00 814 0.84 3.57 11,566
2080 1.00 0.00 814 0.84 3.57 9,277
adopted ones under these grim circumstances. With the breakdown of pooling as a system
of complete care for children, it is only to be expected that natural children will be sent
to school and adopted children put to work. The ensuing inequalities in the next and later
periods will have grave consequences of their own; but they will not be tackled in this paper.
6 Conclusions
The central conclusions of this paper are, ﬁrst, that the AIDS epidemic will peak far in ad-
vance of the economic damage it will ultimately cause. In southern Africa, where prevalence
rates among the age-group 15-49 are already 20 per cent and more, the worst is still to come.
Second, the scale of that damage, in terms of accumulated losses in GDP per capita, will also
be large, even if the measures designed to combat the disease and to ensure the education
of half- and full orphans are well chosen and the ﬁscal means employed to ﬁnance them are
highly efﬁcient. In the absence of such measures, an economic collapse is on the cards.
The main reason for these gloomy ﬁndings lies in the peculiarly insidious and selective
character of the disease. By killing mostly young adults, AIDS does more than destroy
the human capital embodied in them; it also deprives their children of those very things
they need to become economically productive adults – their parents’ loving care, knowledge
and capacity to ﬁnance education. This weakening of the mechanism through which human
92capital is transmitted and accumulated across generations becomes apparent only after a long
lag, and it is progressively cumulative in its effects. Therein lies the source of the difference
between our ﬁndings and those of previous studies, which have focused either on the role of
quasi-ﬁxed factors over the medium run or on the historical record to date.
What are the lessons to be drawn for public policy? Where the prevalence rate is still low,
as in much of Asia, eastern Europe, the Near East and Latin America, it is of the utmost
importance to contain the disease at once: for the economic system as well as for individuals,
an ounce of prevention is worth far more than a pound of cure10.
Where the epidemic is more advanced, combating the disease and its economic effects suc-
cessfully will require a large and determined ﬁscal effort, the correct design of which is a
complicated matter. The theoretical sections of the paper are devoted to a rigorous formula-
tion and analysis of this problem. Intuitively, the question is: what combination of measures
should be adopted to promote the formation of human capital and good health when the
threat of a collapse looms? These measures are partly complementary; for the maintenance
of good health means that the human capital embodied in individuals during childhood and
training will survive and pay off into old age, not only for them, but also for their children.
When ﬁscal resources are very scarce, however, some trade-offs will be unavoidable, requir-
ing the concentration of resources on some programs or groups at the expense of others. The
hope here is that our knowledge about what works in the ﬁelds of child-rearing, education,
the care of orphans, health, and so forth can be distilled into a form where it reveals how to
formulate combined programs of interventions that will ward off the threat of an economic
collapse. The true social rate of return to such programs can be extremely high, whereas
that derived from calculations based on standard (‘local’) cost-beneﬁt analysis may be quite
10Sackey and Raparla (2001a, 2001b) use a simple demographic model to compare the costs of prevention
(sex education, prevention of mother-to-child transmission, increased condom use and voluntary counselling
and testing) with those of mitigation (care of orphans and AIDS patients and payment of pensions) for Namibia
and Swaziland. These packages of measures are estimated to cost 2.6 and 6.8 per cent of GDP, respectively, in
Namibia, and 1.8 and 4.6 per cent of GDP in Swaziland.
93modest. Fiscal policy in general, and policy in the social sectors in particular, must be for-
mulated with a clear eye on its contribution to solving the long-run economic problem posed
by AIDS. For in the event of a collapse of productivity, little else will matter.
These points are vividly illustrated by our results for South Africa. In the absence of the epi-
demic, there would have been the prospect of modest, but accelerating growth of per capita
income. As things now stand, the economy could be on the brink of a progressive collapse.
With the right interventions, this fate can be averted, though the costs are high, even under
favorable social arrangements for the care of orphans. If those arrangements break down,
growth is likely to be rather sluggish. We readily concede that these conclusions must be
regarded as preliminary, and that various aspects of the calibration process in particular need
further work and reﬁnement. Yet the sensitivity analysis already reported above suggests
that these ﬁndings are robust to changes in a variety of key assumptions and parameter val-
ues concerning mortality, the efﬁcacy of measures taken to combat it and the formation of
expectations. And it would be unconscionable to err on the side of optimism.
947 Appendices
7.1 An Example
In this section we examine a particular example in order to illustrate the main results of
section 2.
7.1.1 Household decisions






ct if ct ¸ cmin
¡¥ otherwise
v(lt+1) = d ln(lt+1+z) with 0 < d < 1
We further simplify the analysis by assuming that z(1) =
z(2)
2 ´ z.
To examine the household’s decisions, we form the Lagrangian for st = 1 and st = 2:
L(st) = (3¡st)ct +(3¡st)ntkt+1dfln(2zet lt +1+z)g
+µfa((3¡st)lt +ntg)¡(3¡st +nt b)ct ¡nt agetg













¡µantg · 0; et ¸ 0 complementarily




95Thus, we obtain the optimal choices e0





; st = 1;2 (72)
We immediately observe that e0
t (1) > e0
t (2) as long as an interior solution holds for st = 2.
Obviously, e0
t (st) is set to zero if (72) yields a negative number, and it is set to unity if
(72) yields a number larger than 1. The budget constraint yields the corresponding interior









We summarize the properties of the optimal choices in the following proposition.
Proposition 12
Suppose z > ¡1. Then:
(i) e0
t (1) ¸ e0
t (2)
(ii) e0(st) := limlt!¥ e0






where limt!¥kt+1 = k and nt = n 8t





> 0 for 0 < e0









As long as lt > ˆ l, therefore, the example fulﬁlls all the conditions of the general household
model, as set out in section 2.1.1.
967.1.2 Steady states
We now calculate the steady-state value of lt associated with positive eduction levels. For
thispurpose, werequireastationarymortalityproﬁleandstationaryfertility: kt =k;nt = n 8t:
The steady state is given by:
l¤(st;k) = 2zl¤(3¡st +nb)2kdzl¤¡ag(1+z)
2agzl¤ +1 st = 1;2
Solving for l¤(¢) yields:
Corollary 2
Suppose z > 0 and ag(z+1) > (3¡st +nb)2dkz. Then for st = 1;2; there exists a unique




Note that ¶l¤=¶k < 0: lower premature mortality among adults is associated with a lower
steady-state value of l. Thus, the steady state has the following properties, which accord
with intuition:
Corollary 3





(ii) l¤(2;k) > l¤(1;k)




7.2 Proof of Proposition 3
We proceed from period t = 0 onwards.
97Period 0
There are [1¡p(4)] taxpaying households (recall that N0 = 1), each of which pays at least
tba. The subsidy g is paid to beneﬁciaries, beginning with one-parent households. The
proportion of all households receiving this subsidy is therefore
d0 = [1¡p(4)]tba=g < (1¡p(4)) (74)
where d0 is also the proportion of all children born in period 0 who will fully educate their










the proportion of adults attaining human capital of at least La(2)+tba=a in period 1 is also
d0. Of the rest, [1¡p(4)¡d0]n0 children are raised by at least one parent, but do not attend
school and so attain only l = 1 as adults in period 1; and p(4)¢n0 grow up as full orphans,
who cannot, by assumption, pay any taxes as adults in period 1.
Period 1
The children educated in period 0 marry among themselves as adults in period 1. The sur-
vivors form a total of [1¡p(4)]d0N1 one- and two-parent families. All can pay tba, a tax
which would leave them with at least aLa(2) in net income and so induce them to choose
e0 = 1 for their children.
Since d0 <[1¡p(4)], there are also other potential tax-payers. These are the offspring of the
one- and two-parent households in period 0 that did not receive a subsidy in that period.11 Of
these, the fraction [1¡p(4)] will belong to those unions in which at least one parent survives
into old age. Hence, the number of tax-payers of this kind is [1¡p(4)¡d0][1¡p(4)]N1:
It follows that the total number of tax-paying households in period 1 is [1¡p(4)]2N1; each of
whom will be able to pay at least tba in taxes. Thus, the revenue available for the distribution
of subsidies is at least [1¡p(4)]2N1¢tba, and the number of households that could be paid a
subsidy of ¯ g in period 1 is at least [1¡p(4)]2N1(tba=¯ g):
11We rule out the payment of subsidies to adults who die prematurely.
98The [1¡p(4)]d0N1 households with human capital of at least La(2)+tba=a will choose
e = 1 in the absence of subsidies. The pool of potential beneﬁciaries in period 1, excluding
full orphans, is [1¡p(4)](1¡d0)N1: If [1¡p(4)](1¡d0)N1 < [1¡p(4)]2N1(tba=g); then
the task of educating full orphans can begin. Recalling (74) it is seen that all children of one-
and two-parent households will attend school full-time in period 1 if d0 ¸ 1=2:







We begin with the adults attaining at least z(2)f(1)(La(2)+tba=a)+1: The maximal tax




¤12. The total taxes collected from the whole group









by virtue of z(2)f(1) > 1:
The group attaining La(2)+tba=a is analyzed as in period 1. This group pays taxes in the
amount [1¡p(4)]d1N2¢tba:
Period t
In order to see whether this process eventually generates sufﬁcient funds to promote ev-
eryone, including full orphans, we concentrate on the group that was originally promoted
through subsidies in period 0. The total taxes paid by this (heterogeneous) group in period t
exceed
Yt := [1¡p(4)]t ¢a[Lt(2)¡La(2)]¢d0Nt;
where Lt(2) is the human capital of the adult in a single-parent family that is the last in
an unbroken sequence of such households from period 0 onwards. The capacity of these
12Note that a higher tax can be imposed on the two-parent households.
99revenues to ﬁnance subsidies in a growing population with p(4) > 0 requires normalization









Hence, limt!¥Yt=Nt = ¥ if and only if (1¡p(4))¢z(2)f(1) > 1. The same holds for all
other groups that are ‘promoted’ subsequently. Assumption 12 then yields the desired result.
7.3 Proof of proposition 5
We proceed by comparing double and single targeting.
Double Targeting
In periodt =0 with N0 =1, let each of some group of families receive simultaneously health
and education support of 2h and g, respectively, so that all the adults will survive to old age.





In t = 0, therefore, we obtain the following societal pattern:
² d0n0 children reach, as adults, l1 = z(1)f(e0(2;¡¯ g;1))¢2+1
² (1¡ p)2(1¡d0)n0 children are left as full orphans, who reach l1 = x
² (2p¡ p2)(1¡d0)n0 children go uneducated, and reach l1 = 1
In period t = 1, the educated children marry among themselves. All such families can pay ¯ t
in taxes, provided they receive continued health support in the amount of ¯ h per adult. With
100the revenues B1 = ¯ td0n0=2, the assumption that ¯ t > 2¯ h implies that the society can afford to
































families whose children will attain at least z(1)f(e0(2;¡¯ g;1))¢2+1 in period 2. For period 2
onwards, we assume that the society operates under an optimal education and health support
system whose precise nature we do not (need to) specify further.
Single Targeting
In period t = 0; each of some group of families receives the transfer ¯ g. The share of families





This process generates the following structure:
² p2w0n0 children reach l1 = z(1)f(e0(2a+ ¯ g;1))¢2+1
² 2p(1¡ p)w0n0 children reach l1 = La(2)+ tba
a
² (1¡ p)2w0n0 children are left as full orphans, who reach l1 = x
² another (1¡ p)2(1¡w0)n0 children become orphans, reaching l1 = x
² (2p¡ p2)(1¡w0)n0 children have at least one parent, but receive no education, and
so reach l1 = 1
13We assume here that the adults subsidized in t = 1 were not orphans in t = 0.
101In period t = 1, the adults who were educated in period t = 0 can be taxed as long as they do







Therefore, the society may be able to subsidize a further share of w1 households,15 even
while those educated in period 0 will be fully protected against premature mortality in period
1. The budget constraint is B1 ¸ (2p¡ p2)¯ hw0n0+(¯ g+2¯ h)w1
n0
2 ; which yields
w1 = w0
2p(tba¡2¯ h)¡ p2(2tba¡2¯ h¡¯ t)
¯ g+2¯ h
: (82)
Under ST, therefore, the society supports [(2p¡ p2)w0+w1]n0
2 families over two periods in
such a way that their offspring reach at least La(2)+tba=a in period 2. Note that the share of
families newly subsidized in t = 1 receive support in both domains and are therefore double
targeted. This makes both systems comparable.16 From t = 2 onwards, the society operates
under the same optimal program as under DT.
Comparison
We begin by noting that z(1)f(e0(2;¡¯ g;1))¢2+1 ¸ z(2)f(e0(1;¡¯ g;2))¢1+1. In order
to compare DT and ST, it sufﬁces to compare (d0+d1)n0
2 with [(2p¡ p2)w0+w1]n0
2 ; since
under both systems the offspring of these families will be fully educated and able to pay
taxes when they enter period t = 2 as adults. Therefore, DT is superior to ST if d0 +d1 >
(2p¡ p2)w0+w1. We observe from (77) and (80) that
d0=w0 = ¯ g=(¯ g+2¯ h):
Hence, from (79) and (82) and some algebraic manipulations, it follows that DT is superior
to ST if
14Note that we assume here that only educated adults are taxed.
15Again, we assume that the adults subsidized in t = 1 were not orphans in t = 0.






















Now the expression in brackets on the LHS of this inequality is greater than that in braces on
the RHS for all p 2 (0;1) if ¯ t > tba; they are equal if ¯ t = tba. It follows that DT is superior
to ST if
¯ g






7.4 Proof of Proposition 6
We go through the same line of reasoning employed in the proof of proposition 5. Under
DT with health spending h, there will be no premature adult mortality, and the share of all





where B0 ¸ tba and, by hypothesis, B0 ¸ h. Total revenue in period 1 is then
B1 = [d0t+(1¡d0)tba]N1;
so that the share of all families that can be given a transfer in the amount g in period 1 is
d1 = [d0t+(1¡d0)tba¡h]=g ¸ (tba¡h)=g;
where the weak inequality holds as an equality if and only if tba = t.
Under ST, we have the state vector [p(1);p(2);p(3);p(4)] in period 0. The share of all
families that can be given a transfer in the amount g in period 0 is
w0 = B0=g = d0+(h=g):
This policy yields the following structure of human capital levels in period 1:
103² p(1)w0n0 children attain z(1)f(e0(2a+g;1))¢2+1 and can pay ¯ t
2 in t +1;
² [p(2)+p(3)]w0n0 children attain La(2)+tba;
² [1¡p(4)](1¡w0)n0 have been raised by at least one parent and attain unity;
² p(4)n0 are left as full orphans, and attain x.
Notethatp(1)= p2; p(2)=p(3)= p(1¡p)andp(4)=(1¡p)2. SupposehN1 isaffordable.
Then the gross tax revenue in period 1 will be17
[p(1)w0t+[(p(2)+p(3))w0+(1¡p(4))(1¡w0)]tba]N1;
so that hN1 is indeed affordable if and only if
h · p(1)w0t+[(p(2)+p(3))w0+(1¡p(4))(1¡w0)]tba:





which is always satisﬁed if h · (1¡p(4))tba.
If this condition is violated, however, what we have called ST is, in fact, infeasible.





17Note that we assume in this proposition that all adults can be taxed.
104Hence, in order to establish the superiority of DT over ST, it sufﬁces to compare (d0+d1)n0
2
with [(1¡p(4))w0+w1]n0
2 ; for under both schemes, the offspring of these families will be
fully educated and able to pay taxes when they enter period 2 as adults. Combining the
expressions derived above, we have
d0+d1 > (1¡p(4))w0+w1

























which establishes the result.
7.5 Proof of proposition 7
(i) If parents in period 0 expect the epidemic to continue in period 1, then by assumption
15, no child will attain l¤(1;1) in period 1, regardless of what actually happens in
period 1. Given the educational decisions in period 0, the government will be able to
collect Q1(k1 <1)N1 in taxes. If Q1 <h, there will be insufﬁcient revenue to suppress
the epidemic in period 1, thereby fulﬁlling parents’s expectations in period 0 that the
epidemic will be rampant. The fact that no child attains l¤(1;1) in period 1 implies
that Q2(k2 <1)<Q1(k1 <1), so that the epidemic continues in period 2, and so forth.
The result is a progressive collapse.
If, however, Q1(k1 < 1) ¸ h, the funds to suppress the epidemic will be available,
even with the limited investment in education in period 0 that would occur if parents
expected the epidemic to continue in period 1.
(ii) Suppose, next, that parents in period 0 expect the epidemic to be suppressed in period
1 and choose e0 accordingly. Hence, the children of one- and two-parent families will
105reach l1(2;1) and l1(1;1), respectively, as adults in period 1. Now the maximum that
a family can pay in taxes in period 1 without its children failing to reach l¤(1;1) in
period 2 is a[L1(s0;k = 1)¡L¤(s0;1)]: Hence, if the government is to be able to sup-
press the epidemic in period 1 without destroying the basis for growth in subsequent






Suppose this condition is satisﬁed. Then the expectations at time t = 0 will be fulﬁlled
and the total human capital of all lineages stemming from s0 =1;2;3 will be greater in
period 2 than in period 1, thereby permitting the continued suppression of the epidemic
while also providing some revenues to subsidize, and hence ’promote’, the lineages
stemming from s0 = 4. Since the former lineages will eventually experience growth in
human capital at the rate 2z(1)f(1)¡1>0, the whole society will eventually enter the
condition of self-sustaining growth, with the epidemic fully suppressed in all periods.
If, however, the said condition is violated, the government will be able to ﬁnance hN1
inperiod1onlybysodeprivingatleastsomeofthelineagesstemmingfroms0 =1;2;3
that their children fail to attain at least l¤(1;1) in period 2. The ensuing destruction
of the tax base in period 2 may be so large as to make suppression of the epidemic in
that, or some subsequent, period infeasible.
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Figure 3: Mortality 30q20 as a function of h
110Figure 4: Benchmarks 1 and 2
Figure 5: Policy options 1,2 and 3





















Figure 6: Mortality (20q20) as a function of h

























Figure 7: Variation 1: The benchmarks under 20q20

























Figure 8: Policy Options 1,2 and 3 under 20q20
113Figure 9: Variation 1: A permanent shift in mortality (30q20)
114Figure 10: Variation 1: Policy options 1,2 and 3 (30q20)
115Figure 11: Variation 2: Benchmarks 1 and 2
Figure 12: Variation 2: Policy options 1,2 and 3
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